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PREFACE
Today a substantial part of the European Union’s (EU) budget is spent on
agriculture, a declining sector in Europe, while other and more prioritised
policy areas receive little or no funding. It is thus not surprising that a
common critique levelled against the EU’s budget priorities is that they are
out of touch with the realities of the Union.
This critique has long enjoyed support in the academic literature, where
the question of which policies the European Union should finance has re-
ceived much attention. It would therefore seem obvious that the European
Commission would have a substantial source of knowledge to rely on
when it is drafting its proposal for a new EU budget. However, the author
of the present report, Filipa Figueria, argues that the Commission cannot
rely on the existing body of knowledge, since it fails to acknowledge the
uniqueness of the EU budget in relation to a national budget. The EU is
foremost a legislative union and its spending powers are small and mainly
there to support regulatory initiatives.
The report attempts to take the analysis a step further. It does so by
integrating insights from a number of disciplines so as to facilitate better
decision-making on EU expenditures. The multidisciplinary approach
employed combines economics of the public sector, fiscal federalism,
political criteria and legal principles. A twelve-step analysis is developed,
which is then applied to the main areas of policy-making. It is concluded
that more money should be spent on inter alia research, development and
transport and energy policy, while agricultural funding should be reduced
to nil.
Anna Stellinger
Director, SIEPS 
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6EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The current review of the EU budget could finally lead to the long-awaited
reform of European finances. The European Commission is under a man-
date from the EU Member States to reexamine the budget in-depth.
Although the economic and institutional crisis currently affecting the EU
render a deal more difficult, the review could still lead to significant results.
The EU budget has long been criticised as being out of touch with the
realities of today’s EU. Almost half of the budget is allocated to agriculture,
a sector which is declining in Europe. By contrast, areas where the EU is
becoming increasingly important, such as home affairs or policies for
economic growth, are almost not supported by its budget. There is therefore
a growing consensus, both within the EU institutions and between national
governments, that the EU budget needs to be radically reformed.
However, as the European Commission is currently drafting its proposal, it
is becoming clear that the existing literature does not provide an adequate
basis for the Commission’s work, because it is considered too far removed
from political reality. In particular, the literature does not take into account
that the EU budget is not equivalent to a national budget, because the EU
is essentially a legislative union, where spending powers have remained
small and are mainly there to support the regulatory initiatives. Therefore a
different type of analysis is needed to address not only the economic issues
involved, but the political aspects as well.
This study attempts to help fill the gap in the literature by proposing
a methodology for analysing the EU budget that is consistent with the
current political reality. The method proposed is multidisciplinary, com-
bining the branch of economics generally used to analyse the EU and its
budget (known as fiscal federalism) with another branch of economics
(public sector economics), political science and the legal concept of sub-
sidiarity. From these four disciplines, twelve steps are derived, and this
twelve-step analysis is applied to the main areas of policy-making to assess
whether or not they should be funded by the EU budget.
In addition, the analysis addresses two points that are often ignored in
the literature on the EU budget. One is that it is not sufficient to analyse
a policy as a whole, without differentiating between the sub-areas of that
policy. The second is that the EU budget should not be assessed in isola-
tion from the national budgets. While some academics have recently
emphasised these two points, to the knowledge of this author, no com-
prehensive analysis of the budget has yet been performed that actually
follows them.
7Hence the focus of this study will not be on whether a policy area as a
whole should receive funding, but rather on which parts of a policy area
that should be funded by the EU budget. It is argued that for most policy
areas the question is not whether or not they should be funded in the first
place, but which specific programmes within the policy area should
receive EU funding. This relates to the second point, that EU spending
should be analysed in relation to national spending. EU spending pro-
grammes co-exist with national spending programmes and must be
designed with this in mind.
Although this report acknowledges the political realities of the EU, it
deliberately avoids basing its proposals on political economy considera-
tions. That is to say, a choice was made to propose an optimal structure for
the EU budget, rather than the structure most likely to be approved by the
Member States in the coming negotiations. It is argued that the first step in
the analysis is to determine which areas and programmes should be funded
by the EU budget. The second step is then to determine which reforms in
the direction of the optimal budget can realistically be taken in this review,
and which should be left for the future.
The report is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology
proposed. The method combines the insights of economics of the public
sector, fiscal federalism, political criteria and legal principles to analyse
the EU budget. These insights are then translated into twelve conditions
that a policy must pass if it is to be funded by the budget.
Section 3 then applies this method to the different policy-making areas.
The section begins by selecting the areas that will be analysed. Each area
is then assessed in detail using the twelve steps. The section concludes
with a proposal of how the EU budget should be spent. The concluding
section points out additional issues for reflection and further study.
The following paragraphs offer a brief summary of the methodology. The
first steps of the methodology are derived from public economics, the
branch of economics that analyses the activities of government. At national
level, these theories underpin most public policies; however, Figueira
(2008) argues that they are often forgotten at the EU level. The three steps
derived from public economics are: 1. Is the spending programme needed,
to address a market failure or an equity goal? 2. Does this failure/goal
require government action in terms of funding or regulation? 3. Can inter-
vention be cost-effective?
The following steps are derived from fiscal federalism, the branch of eco-
nomics that analyses which functions of a government are best performed
at a centralised level and which are best done at a decentralised level.
When applied to the EU, these theories analyse which policies should be
the responsibility of the EU and which should remain national – in other
words, the question of what the EU should do.
The three steps derived from fiscal federalism are: 4. Should the spending
programme be allocated to the EU level because it is addressing EU-level
externalities or economies of scale? 5. Or should it be allocated to the
national level because preferences regarding that policy area differ too
much between countries? 6. Are there government failures affecting the
policy area that can be minimised at EU or at national level?
This study argues that, alongside economic factors, an analysis of the EU
budget must address political issues. To reflect these issues, two types of
analysis are used. The first (step 7) is a discussion of what should be the
priorities of the EU budget: whether the EU budget can be seen as a
bargaining tool for the Member States; as a way to make the EU more
popular; as leverage for national policies; or whether it should have only
allocative or redistributive objectives.
The second type of analysis is a discussion of which policies are legitimate
at the EU level, based on the academic literature from the field of political
science on the legitimacy of the EU. The steps derived are: 8. Does public
opinion support this policy being at EU level or at national level? 9. Are
the political procedures followed in relation to this policy more account-
able and democratic at EU or at national level? 10. Is it justified from a
normative point of view to allocate the policy to the EU?
Finally, the legal principles in the EU Treaty are used to give further guid-
ance. Step 11 looks at the concept of subsidiarity, which says that the EU
should only take action in areas where it can be more efficient than the
national governments. Step 12 looks at the principle of proportionality: if
the EU does intervene, the intervention should be proportional, or limited
to what is necessary to achieve the objective of the policy.
In the second part of the study, the methodology will be applied to the
main areas of EU expenditure. Each area will be analysed based on the
twelve steps. By answering those questions it will be possible to conclude
whether or not a certain area of spending should exist in the EU budget.
The main conclusions are twofold: Firstly, contrary to what is often recom-
mended in the literature, the EU budget should not be an exact reflection
of EU priorities. This is because EU activities are essentially based on
regulation, not on funding. Thus a decision to fund a policy at EU level
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should be based on whether funding is needed to support the regulatory
activities, not on how important the policy is at EU level.
Secondly, although ideally the EU budget should target a small number of
areas, so as to be effective despite its small size, it is also true that the EU
is now involved in almost all areas of policy-making and that action needs
funding to be effective. A solution to this contradiction could be to keep
small budget lines to support most areas.
The concrete proposals are as follows:
• Cohesion policy should continue receiving the same share of the EU
budget, that is, approximately one third of the budget;
• Agriculture should no longer be an item in the budget;
• Spending on research policy should be significantly increased;
research should become the second largest item after cohesion policy;
• Four other policy areas should have their spending shares significantly
increased: development policy; external relations; freedom, security
and justice; transport and energy;
• The following areas should receive only a small amount of opera-
tional funding: education; culture; social affairs and employment;
enterprise; environment; consumer and health policy; and communica-
tion.
9
1 INTRODUCTION
With four years to go before the 2007-2013 budgetary package expires,
EU Member States would now normally be enjoying a welcome break
from those thorny negotiations on “who gets what” from the EU budget.
Instead, they are about to receive a proposal for budget reform from the
European Commission that they will need to debate in the Council.
The reason for this early start in the negotiations is a clause in the agree-
ment on the Financial Perspectives for 2007-2013 that stipulates a review
of the budget half way through its seven-year period (Council of the
European Union, 2005). It was hoped that this “mid-term review” would
lead to the results that had not been achieved in the negotiations. At the
time, the necessary political deals had not been achieved, and the new
package was almost identical to the previous one. 
Under the agreement, the Commission was to issue its proposal in 2008 or
2009. The Commission therefore launched a consultation procedure in
September 2007 to seek opinions and advice from both experts and stake-
holders on how the EU budget could be restructured (European Commis-
sion, 2007). Now the hardest part of the work remains to be done: present-
ing a proposal on how to reform the EU budget that will both bring the
necessary changes and also be acceptable to all Member States.
However, it is becoming clear that the existing literature does not provide a
sufficient basis for the Commission’s proposal because it is considered too
far removed from political reality. In particular, studies do not take into
account that the EU budget is different from a national budget due to the
EU being essentially a legislative union where spending powers have
remained small and exist mainly to support regulatory initiatives. 
This study attempts to help fill the gap in the literature by proposing a
method for analysing the EU budget that is consistent with the current
political reality. The method combines insights on the economics of the
public sector, fiscal federalism, political criteria and legal principles to
analyse the EU budget. These insights are translated into twelve conditions
which, if met, imply that a policy should be funded by the EU budget. 
The focus of this study will not be on whether a policy area as a whole
should be funded by the EU budget, but rather on which parts of a policy
area should be funded. It is argued that for most policy areas, the question
is not whether or not they should receive EU funding, but which specific
programmes within the policy area should be EU-funded. In addition, EU
spending will be analysed in relation to national spending. EU spending
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programmes co-exist with national spending programmes and must be
designed with this in mind. 
Although this report acknowledges the political realities of the EU, it
deliberately does not base its proposals on political economy considera-
tions. That is, a choice was made to propose the optimal structure of the
EU budget, and not the structure most likely to be approved by the
Member States in the coming negotiations. It is argued that the first step in
the analysis is to determine which areas and programmes should be funded
by the EU budget. The second step is then to determine which reforms in
the direction of the optimal budget can realistically be attempted by the
Commission in the current review and which should be left for the future. 
Section 2 details the methodology proposed. It describes the four areas of
academic research from which the methodology is derived and the twelve
steps of the method. Section 3 then applies this method to the different
policy areas. The section begins by selecting the areas to be analysed; each
area is then assessed in detail using the twelve steps. The section closes by
proposing how the EU budget should be spent. The conclusions highlights
additional issues for reflection and further study.
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2 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology proposed combines different academic lenses so as to
take into account all the aspects that are important when assessing the EU
budget. Figure 1 shows the twelve criteria that should be used to assess
whether a certain policy area or spending programme should be funded by
the EU budget.
12
    A. Public 
economics
B. Fiscal 
federalism
C. Political 
criteria
D. Legal 
principles
4.  Economies of scale 
or externalities
Figure 1 Criteria for EU funding
1. Market failure or 
equity goal
3. Cost-effectiveness
2. Funding or
regulation 5. Heterogeneity
6. Second best
7. EU budget 
objectives
8. Public opinion
9. Procedural 
legitimacy
10. Normative
justifi ability
11. Subsidiarity
12. Proportionality
This section describes the criteria used in the analysis and the academic
fields of study on which each criterion will be based.
A. Public sector economics
The first column contains criteria derived from concepts of public sector
economics, the branch of economics that analyses the activities of govern-
ment. While these theories underpin most public policies at national level,
Figueira (2008) argues that they are often forgotten at EU level. 
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Public economics considers that a government can intervene for two
reasons: either to correct market failures (efficiency reason) or to ensure
social justice (equity reason). If this reasoning is applied to the EU budget,
we conclude that a budget line should only exist if it either: 
(i) corrects a market failure at EU level – that is, it will enable the
internal market to function better (for example, grants to help mobility
of workers), or;
(ii) contributes to an EU equity goal (for example, helping the economic
convergence of the poorest Member States through cohesion funds). 
Step 2: Funding or regulation
If we conclude that public intervention is required in a certain area, it is then
necessary to assess the type of intervention needed. The three main types of
government intervention are funding, regulation and public production.
Section 3 presents a selection of the areas of EU action that have potential
funding implications; only these areas will be covered by the analysis. 
However, this step is still necessary because most areas of government
intervention involve both funding and regulation, and this distinction is
important for assessing areas where EU action is considered useful regard-
less of whether that action should be in terms of funding or regulation. 
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
In addition, the spending programme must be cost-effective, in that its
benefits must be greater than its costs. Moreover, the policy should meet
its stated objectives efficiently. 
B. Fiscal federalism
Fiscal federalism is the branch of economics that analyses which functions
of a government are best performed at a centralised level and which are
best performed at a decentralised level. When applied to the EU, these
theories analyse which policies should be the responsibility of the EU and
which should remain national. The main premise is that a policy should be
conducted at a more central/EU level if this would make the policy more
cost-effective.
To assess whether the EU level or the national level is more efficient, fis-
cal federalism looks at a number of factors; these factors constitute the
next steps of the analysis.
Step 4: Externalities and economies of scale
Externalities occur when the activities of A lead to costs (or benefits) for
B that A does not bear (or does not reap). For example, if a factory causes
air pollution, the people living in the vicinity will be exposed to poorer air
quality. However, the factory will not take that cost into account in its pro-
duction decisions unless there are government regulations to this effect.
Fiscal federalism says that if there are positive or negative externalities be-
tween EU Member States in a certain policy area, that policy area should
be allocated at EU level. Hence policy-makers will be able to design the
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policy so as to take into consideration its effects throughout the EU, while
if it were to be placed at national level it would not necessarily address the
potential effects on other countries.
Economies of scale occur when the cost of producing a good decreases if
the good is produced in a larger quantity. For example, if an entire factory
is used to build just two cars, each of those cars will cost a lot of money;
but if the same factory builds a million cars, the cost of the factory equip-
ment will be spread across the cars, and each individual car will cost much
less. If there are potential gains from economies of scale, fiscal federalism
says that a policy should be centralised. 
Step 5: Heterogeneity of preferences
These two factors (economies of scale and externalities) are balanced
against the fact that people in different countries have heterogeneous pre-
ferences. If those preferences vary significantly, the policy should not be
centralised and each Member State can continue designing the policy to
suit its own population.
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
The recent literature known as “second generation fiscal federalism”
(Oates, 2005), includes considerations of political economy by addressing
political failure, that is, that governments, at any level, are not always
benevolent welfare maximisers (they can be corrupt or inefficient, for
example). In this second-best setting, allocating policies at different levels
of government can be used as a way of choosing the level where political
economy problems are fewer.
C. Political criteria
This study argues that, alongside economic factors, an analysis of the EU
budget must address political issues. This is because the EU budget is dif-
ferent from a national budget for the following two reasons.
Firstly, it is much smaller. The EU budget represents only about 1 per cent
of EU GDP, while a national budget amounts to about half of the country’s
GDP. Therefore, the EU budget is not large enough to be allocated to
all the areas in which EU public spending could theoretically be more
effective than national spending – at least not on a scale large enough to
allow it to have any significant impact. For this reason, a political choice
needs to be made between the various areas in which the EU budget could
potentially be more effective than a national budget. A decision must be
made on what the priorities should be for the EU budget.
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Secondly, for a political union such as the EU, the decision to centralise
policies should be based not only on efficiency considerations but also on
whether reducing national sovereignty over such policies is considered
legitimate. 
To reflect these issues, this study uses two types of analysis: a discussion
of what EU budget objectives, considering Step 7, should be and a discus-
sion of which policies are legitimate at EU level, based on the political
science literature on the legitimacy of the EU (Steps 8, 9 and 10). 
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
As has been argued, the EU budget is not large enough to be allocated to
all the areas where it could in theory be effective. A decision therefore
needs to be made on what the priorities should be, taking certain factors
into account. 
The EU budget as a bargaining tool
Although this argument is generally ignored by researchers and analysts,
many believe that the EU budget should be used not as a way to com-
plement EU policy-making but as a way to help secure political deals. This
study argues that this approach is wrong – there is no justification for us-
ing over EUR 100 billion per year for this purpose.
Nonetheless, it is a valid consideration that political realities make parts of
the budget difficult to reform. However, the goal of a study such as this is
to suggest how the budget could best be spent, not how its reform could be
accomplished with less difficulty. It is argued that the first step is to estab-
lish how the budget should be spent and the second step, which is outside
the scope of this paper, is to suggest how the proposed reforms could be
implemented given the political reality. Even so, this study will refer to
political realities where relevant, without considering them as factors.
The EU budget as a tool to boost the EU’s popularity
Another aspect generally ignored by researchers but widely accepted in
policy-making circles is whether the EU budget should help make the EU
more popular and/or more accountable and transparent. 
It could be argued that, given the existence of the EU, the promotion of
communication and democracy has become a public good. If this is seen as
the reverse side of the coin, or the price to pay for the benefits of the EU, it
could justify public intervention. However, it is necessary to distinguish
between three different aspects of this issue: transparency/communication,
EU popularity, and promotion of European identity and values.
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Transparency/communication: It is argued that spending a small part of the
EU budget on promoting communication and transparency is justified to
ensure that citizens understand the EU and to reduce the democratic
deficit. This could compensate for the decline in legitimacy caused by
transferring spending to EU level. However, this should be done under the
budget heading intended for this purpose, namely communication. 
EU popularity: It is argued that spending part of the EU budget specifically
for this purpose is unjustifiable. Taxpayers should not have to pay for the
self-promotion of the EU institutions. Nonetheless, it could be argued that
EU popularity could be a factor in choosing between different policies that
could benefit from EU funding – choosing policies that people want at EU
level would boost popularity and increase the legitimacy of the EU. This
factor will be addressed in the analysis on legitimacy.
European identity and values: The promotion of the European identity, and
of the image of the EU in the world, could be seen as factors to be covered
by the EU budget, just as this type of concern also exists at national level. 
However, at national level, no part of the budget is specifically allocated
to promoting the image of the country. Instead, this is done via different
policies, such as culture (as a way to promote tourism, preserve cultural
heritage or promote the country’s language), foreign affairs (improving the
country’s standing in the world) and local government spending (promoting
different regions). As regards the self-promotion of the government, this is
done via the funds allocated to political parties. The same should be done
at EU level: the budgets for culture, foreign policy and other policies could
include considerations of this kind.
In practice, it will clearly be difficult to differentiate between these three
goals. Still, an effort to do so should be made as they should be addressed
in different ways. 
The EU budget as leverage 
The EU budget cannot be assessed in isolation from national budgets for
two reasons. Firstly, when deciding what should be financed at EU level,
we are generally making a choice, not on whether a certain spending line
should exist or not, but on whether it should be at the EU level or at the
national level. Secondly, as the EU budget is very small, it can only be
effective in conjunction with national spending – this is often called the
“leveraging effect” of the EU budget. 
For example, the reason EU cohesion funding has been so effective in
several countries is that it has been accompanied in those countries by a
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national strategy to improve the infrastructure for economic growth. Simi-
larly, EU spending on research will be most effective if it is accompanied
by national strategies to improve research policy, for example by providing
monetary incentives for those improvements.
In this sense, the most important effect of the EU budget is not the actual
spending programmes it finances, but the way in which its spending pro-
grammes impact national policy-making and national spending. Despite
this, as Buti and Nava (2003; p. 2) point out, “the issue of coordination
between EU and national budgets is an area left largely unexplored by the
economic literature”.
The EU budget: allocative or redistributive?
Another issue to consider is whether the EU budget should mainly be used
for redistribution between the Member States or for allocation policies.
This study argues that the budget can be used for both those goals, but this
requires a clear decision on which policies are aimed at redistribution and
which are aimed at allocative efficiency. This is essential because policies
can only be efficient if they target the right objective.
The Sapir Report (Sapir et al., 2003) stresses the importance of making
this distinction and respecting the principle of “one fund for one goal”. It
proposed the division of the budget into three funds: one allocative –
directed specifically at increasing economic growth – and the other two
redistributive, one for the existing cohesion policy and the other for pro-
viding support to those affected by economic restructuring. 
However, it could also be argued that the EU budget should not be used
for redistribution and that Member States should receive from the EU
budget an amount similar to what they pay into it – this is the argument of
“juste retour”. 
One solution would be for cohesion policy to be the only redistributive
policy and for all the others to have no redistributive effects. Heinemann et
al. (2008) suggest a “limited correction mechanism”, whereby Member
States would be compensated from the redistribution effects of policies
that are not aimed at redistribution. Although it is beyond the scope of this
paper to discuss the financing of the EU budget, this suggestion shows that
it would be possible to isolate the two effects. 
The EU budget as a tool to improve the efficiency of public spending
According to most economists, the EU budget should be used to replace
national spending whenever this can be done more cost-effectively at EU
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level. This is the logic of fiscal federalism. However, this study argues that
this consideration is essential but in itself insufficient. 
Conclusion
From these factors, three main considerations not yet covered by other
aspects of the multidisciplinary analysis emerge. These are: whether a policy
area can/should contribute to promoting EU values or ideals, whether EU
spending in the policy area has leverage effects and whether the reforms
proposed are politically realistic. 
Steps 8, 9 and 10
The next three steps are concerned with the legitimacy of financing
policies at EU level. The concept of legitimacy is used in the political
science literature to assess the rightfulness or acceptability of a govern-
ment and its policies. This issue is highly relevant in the EU context and a
growing body of literature is now examining the legitimacy of the EU and
its policies. 
The concept of legitimacy is by nature subjective and difficult to measure.
For this reason the most recent literature attempts to tackle the complexity
of the concept by looking at a combination of several factors (see, for ex-
ample, Beetham, 1993; Lord and Magnette, 2001). Figueira (2007) identi-
fies six main factors of legitimacy in the literature and suggests that three
of these are particularly relevant for assessing the specific issue of which
policies should be undertaken at EU level. These three factors are the next
steps in this analysis.
Step 8: Public opinion
The main element of legitimacy is public acceptance. This cannot be
measured entirely through a government’s ratings in surveys or the rating
of actions undertaken by the government. This is because, in representa-
tive democracies, governments do not always have to follow public
opinion; on the contrary, it can be argued that governments should, when
necessary, take unpopular measures if these are beneficial in the long
term. However, measures of public opinion can and should be used for
assessing legitimacy.
Concerning the issue at stake here, that is, which policies can legitimately
be transferred to the EU level, the EU-wide Eurobarometer surveys are a
very useful tool. The surveys include a question designed specifically to
measure the opinion of people on which policies should be undertaken at
EU level, often known as the “subsidiarity question”. The answers to this
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question in the 2008 Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2008a) will
be used in this study as a proxy for public opinion.1
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
Procedural legitimacy measures whether the political processes followed
by the government are democratic and accountable. This requires the hold-
ing of fair elections and free and equal competition for political office, and
a system of political institutions that guarantees control mechanisms of
political power. In the EU, the degree of procedural legitimacy varies
greatly across policy areas due to different levels of integration, different
legislative processes applied and some EU-level policies that are easier for
citizens to follow than others.
Step 10: Normative justifiability
David Beetham (1991, 1993) argues that one of the conditions for
legitimacy was normative justifiability, whereby “rules should be justifi-
able by reference to shared beliefs”. These beliefs are of two types:
“beliefs about the rightful source of political authority” and “beliefs about
the appropriate ends or purposes that the government should serve”
(Beetham, 1993; p. 488-89.). 
Beliefs about the appropriate ends or purposes of the European Union are
of particular importance when analysing which policies should be under-
taken at EU level. However, views on what these appropriate ends or
purposes are differ from country to country and even from person to
person. Therefore, an analysis based on normative justifiability will pro-
duce different results depending on which set of beliefs about the purpose
of the EU is used. 
Figueira (2007) proposes a set of beliefs that can be used to operationalise
this concept. The proposal is based on the premise that the EU was created
to prevent future wars and conflicts between its members, and this was to
be achieved through the creation of a free trade area. It therefore had two
main objectives: economic integration and peace in Europe. Although the
EU areas of activity have increased since its creation, it can be argued that
these are the only two objectives on which there is broad agreement that
the EU should play a key role. 
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1 Question A20a of Eurobarometer No. 68, Autumn 2007: “For each of the following areas,
do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) government or made
jointly within the European Union?”
These two objectives can still be subject to various interpretations.
Economic integration can be seen either in its narrowest sense – a free
trade area among Member States – or in its broadest sense – a complete
harmonisation of economic policies, which in itself can be seen (or not) as
justification for political integration. 
The objective of promoting peace can also be seen in its narrowest sense –
no action by the EU is required in this field because peace derives from
the free trade area – or in its widest sense: the justification for a common
defence policy, a common foreign policy and the harmonisation of Justice
and Home Affairs policies. 
D. Legal principles 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
The EU Treaty also offers legal guidance on which competences should be
at EU or national level. Under the principle of subsidiarity, which was
added to EU law by the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, the EU should only
take action in areas where it can be more effective than the national
governments. 
Article 5 of the EC Treaty states: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
This article was clearly written with the principles of fiscal federalism
in mind; in essence it says that the competences of the EU should be
determined according to the principles of fiscal federalism, except for the
policies on which the Member States have given “exclusive competence”
to the EU. The principle of subsidiarity therefore largely overlaps with the
analysis of fiscal federalism. However, it adds to it in four ways:
First, it gives legal backing to the fiscal federalism analysis. Therefore, in
addition to being a means of measuring the relative efficiency of policies
at EU level, fiscal federalism has also become a way of measuring their
legitimacy from a legal perspective.
Secondly, Article 5 EC excludes areas of exclusive competence from
having to comply with the principles of fiscal federalism. However, this
will not prevent us from using fiscal federalism to analyse these areas as
well, since from a theoretical perspective it applies just as much to them. 
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Thirdly, Article 5 EC implies that in cases where the policy could be
achieved equally well at EU level and national level, it should remain
national. This was intended as a way to limit EU powers and prevent
excessive integration. Several authors interpret this as meaning that
a policy should only be centralised if it is clear that it would be more
effective at EU level. For example, Persson et al. (1996; p. 1) interpret
from this condition that “the burden of proof lies with the advocates of
centralisation”. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Article 5 EC refers to each “proposed
action”, implying that the fiscal federalism analysis should be performed
for each policy action individually rather than for the policy area as a
whole. This connects with the point made above about the importance of
the analysis being conducted this way. 
Pelkmans (2006; p. 4) suggests a five-step test for applying the principle
of subsidiarity in practice (Point 5 refers to the principle of proportionality,
which is analysed separately in the following section):
1. Identify whether a measure falls within the area of shared competences
(if exclusive to the EC, the subsidiarity test does not apply).
2. Apply the criteria (scale and externalities, Article 5 EC, and possibly other
criteria) – this is the ‘need to act’ test.
3. Verify whether credible cooperation is feasible.
4. If 1 and 2 are confirmed, and 3 denied, then the assignment is to the Union
level.
5. Define to what extent (proportionality) implementation, monitoring and
enforcement should also be assigned to the EC level, or, indeed, can be
assigned to the Member States, perhaps in a common framework.
For each policy, this section will look at whether the policy is an exclusive
competence of the EU and at whether the fiscal federalism analysis has
clearly revealed that the different policy actions could be better achieved at
EU level.
Step 12: Proportionality
Article 5 EC goes on to say that:
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve
the objectives of this Treaty.
Hence, if the EU does intervene, the intervention should be proportional or
limited to what is necessary to achieve the objective of the policy.
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Conclusion for each policy
In the second part of the study, the methodology will be applied to the
main areas of EU expenditure. For each of these areas, an analysis will be
conducted based on the twelve steps outlined above. The findings will then
help conclude whether or not a certain area of spending should be part of
the EU budget. 
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3 APPLICATION TO POLICY AREAS
This section will apply the proposed methodology to the different policy-
making areas to determine whether they should be funded by the EU
budget and, if so, which parts of the policy area should receive the funding. 
To apply the complete methodology to the EU budget, it will be necessary
to first select the areas of public spending to be analysed and then apply the
twelve steps to each area. This will show whether or not, on the basis of this
assessment, a certain area of spending should be included in the EU budget. 
3.1 Choice of policy areas
Most studies opt to take as a starting point the current structure of the EU
budget and analyse each of the five headings of expenditure. However, this
can result in an initial bias. As it starts from the current allocation of fund-
ing, the reasoning can be influenced by the current spending priorities.
Moreover, it is argued that several of the EU budget headings are deliber-
ately misleading; for example, the heading of “competitiveness” groups
together policies that have little in common under the pretence that they all
contribute to competitiveness in Europe.
This study will instead take as a starting point the areas of EU policy-
making, identify those among them that involve public intervention in the
form of spending, and use the resulting list as a starting point for the
analysis. Given that the EU is now active in all the major areas of policy-
making (although to varying degrees), it will be possible to look at all the
areas of government intervention. However, to avoid the initial bias, the
study will ignore the current extent of EU powers in each of those areas
and regard them as equal. 
It could be argued that the bias is useful because any reform of the EU
budget will need to start with the existing budget. However, as explained
above, the aim of this study is to find the optimal structure of the EU
budget, not to find the easiest way to reform it. 
The policy areas of the EU can be obtained by listing the departments,
called Directorates-General, of the European Commission. These are:
• Agriculture and Rural Development
• Competition
• Economic and Financial Affairs
• Education and Culture
• Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities
• Energy and Transport
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• Enterprise and Industry
• Environment
• Executive Agencies
• Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
• Health and Consumers
• Information Society and Media
• Internal Market and Services
• Joint Research Centre
• Justice, Freedom and Security
• Regional Policy
• Research
• Taxation and Customs Union
• Development
• Enlargement
• EuropeAid – Co-operation Office
• External Relations
• Humanitarian Aid
• Trade
• Communication
• European Anti-Fraud Office
• Eurostat
• Publications Office
• Secretariat General
In addition there are twelve internal services.
This report will not analyse the administration aspects of the EU since the
aim of the study is to assess which policies should be located at EU or
national level and not to assess how the EU runs its administration. All
administrative, internal and non-policy related areas are therefore excluded
from the analysis.
Furthermore, the study only analyses the areas that have considerable
spending implications or where government intervention involves public
funding. The following areas will therefore be excluded from the analysis:
competition, economic and financial affairs, internal market and trade. It
should be noted here that the EU does not perform stabilisation policies
because its budget is too small to have an impact on the business cycle. 
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3.2 Application step by step
3.2.1 Agriculture
Short description 
When the integration process started in the 1950s, Member States agreed
to give up their national farming policies in favour of a Common Agri-
cultural Policy (CAP). At the time, ensuring food security in Europe was
seen as an important objective, and the CAP was considered to be the best
way to ensure this. Fifty years later, this policy is controversial; as will be
seen in the analysis that follows, its usefulness is being questioned by
analysts and policy-makers.
These criticisms have led to successive reforms of the CAP but today it
still represents 42 per cent of the EU budget.2 This policy consists mainly
of support for the farming sector. In the past, this support was mostly pro-
vided through market interventions, which made food production in the
EU artificially competitive. Following reforms, it is now based mainly on
direct transfers to the farming sector; these are considered less costly and
less market distorting. 
In addition, approximately one quarter of the expenditure is now directed
at “rural development” policies that aim to preserve the countryside. Finally,
about 1.5 per cent of spending goes to fisheries. Fishermen do not receive
the extensive support received by farmers. The focus of the policy is not
on fostering the competitiveness of this sector but on Member States’
access to fishing waters and, in recent years, preserving the environment
and fish stocks.
Main results
The analysis that follows shows that no justification exists for funding
agriculture at EU level as agriculture fails virtually every step of the test.
Although there may be justification for government funding to support
agriculture as a means to ensure the viability of rural areas, this policy
should be located at national level, not at EU level. Moreover, it is
designed, managed and implemented in a very inefficient way; it is likely
that at national level these problems could be reduced. In addition, it is not
transparent or politically accountable. For these reasons, it is advised that
agriculture should no longer be an item in the EU budget.
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2 The percentages of current spending for each policy area were calculated on the basis of the
Preparation of the 2009 Preliminary Draft Budget. They correspond to the actual spending
in each area and not to the official headings of expenditure.
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Box 1  Analysis applied to agriculture
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
The initial justification for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was twofold: to guarantee
the security of food supply, and to create a common market in agriculture. However, the first
justification is no longer valid, as EU Member States are now too wealthy for food shortage
to be conceivable. Concerning the second justification, this would only require common
regulations at EU level to dismantle the barriers to free trade, as is the case for other goods –
it does not justify EU subsidies for agriculture. The CAP therefore no longer addresses any
current market failures. 
Concerning equity goals, there is no justification for the EU budget supporting only the workers
in the farming sector and not those in other sectors; moreover, most of the funding is given to
the largest and wealthiest farmers. Nunez Ferrer (2007; p. 16) shows that the CAP “benefits
countries with the highest yields, and within those countries the larger – and often wealthier –
farmers.”
However, defenders of the CAP argue that it is still needed to preserve the countryside in
increasingly industrialised countries (European Commission, 1997). Accordingly, funding has
been gradually transferred to “rural development” policies. 
These policies have three official goals (European Council, 2006): firstly, the need to
preserve the countryside, which implies finding a viable use for agricultural regions, either by
making their agricultural production economically sustainable or by adapting them for
tourism and preserving the environment; secondly, preserving the environment of the rural
areas by promoting environmentally-friendly agriculture; and thirdly, restructuring the farm
sector. This set of justifications is known as “multifunctionality” and refers to the benefits –
other than food production – that agriculture provides. 
The first reason implies a market failure: rural areas are a public good, and this could justify
government intervention to maintain that public good. The second reason also implies a
market failure: government intervention to protect the environment is justified because of
negative externalities – damage to the environment caused by a farm has a negative impact on
the entire population for which the farm does not pay. The third reason corresponds to an
equity goal: helping farmers find other employment. 
The three justifications for the CAP are therefore valid reasons for government intervention.
However, as we will see below, this intervention should be by national governments and not
at EU level. 
Step 2: Funding or regulation
Government funding is justified in the case of a public good, such as the preservation of rural
areas, to subsidise the production of a good from which society as a whole may benefit. As
regards restructuring policies, government funding is also justified to help support people
affected by restructuring. However, as for the environmental goal, the most appropriate instru-
ment would be regulation. 
Therefore, two of the goals of the CAP justify government funding but the following steps
will show that this funding should be at national level. 
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
The CAP is highly inefficient at meeting its stated goals. Nunez Ferrer (2007) demonstrates
that the goals of the CAP, as listed in Article 33 of the EU Treaty, are not met by the policy. 
This low cost-efficiency is due to two main reasons: firstly, the policy targets the wrong goal
because it was initially designed to meet the goals of security of food supply and, due to the
difficulties in achieving reforms in this area, it was not sufficiently modified to reflect its
new goals. Secondly, the fiscal federalism analysis will show that the situation of each
country is different, so it is very inefficient to implement this policy at EU level. 
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Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
There is wide agreement in the literature on fiscal federalism that agricultural policies should
be handed back to national level (Breuss and Eller, 2004). Some authors even argue that there
is no justification for a policy that funds agriculture, be it at EU or national level because this
is a sector where EU countries have no comparative advantage (Hoeller et al., 1996). 
As seen in the previous section, public funding of agriculture in Europe could still be justified
by multifunctionality (preservation of the countryside, preserving the environment of the rural
areas and restructuring the farm sector). However, there are no externalities in the policies to
maintain the national countryside, as these mainly affect national citizens and their territories.
Nor are there economies of scale to be gained from a common policy to preserve the country-
side as policies need to be differentiated to adapt to the different conditions of each country.
Step 5: Heterogeneity
At the same time, heterogeneity is high. Firstly, citizens have different views concerning the
preservation of their countryside. While in some countries there is a strong willingness to
maintain rural areas, even at a high cost, in others this concern is less important. A recent
special issue of Eurobarometer focusing on agriculture found that 57 per cent of respondents
in Finland considered agriculture and rural areas to be “very important” concerns, while only
31 per cent of respondents in Bulgaria gave the same answer (European Commission, 2008b). 
Secondly, to be effective, these policies must target the specific region that they are meant for
since they need to be adapted to the region’s potential; for example, some regions are viable
as tourist destinations while others are not, or while agriculture can be economically sustain-
able in some regions this does not apply to all regions.
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism 
Second generation fiscal federalism adds that there is a significant case of political failure in
EU level agricultural policy as it has been captured by vested interests and lobbies in Brussels
(Swinnen and Van der Zee, 1993); this offers a further reason to keep these policies at national
level. 
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Although this section shows that the CAP should simply be phased out and totally renation-
alised, in practice this will be extremely difficult to achieve. This is because, at EU budget
negotiations, each Member State attempts to obtain the largest share of the EU budget. Since
the CAP represents the lion’s share of the budget, ending spending in this area will be
opposed by all the countries on the receiving end. The CAP has therefore become the text-
book case of a political failure at EU level; this policy is still in existence mainly due to the
difficulty, given the present political setting, of reforming it. 
This may have led some analysts to shy away from advising an end to the CAP, as they
believe that it is not politically realistic to expect that it will ever happen. However, this study
argues that the first step in reforming the EU budget is to assess how it should be spent, and
only the second step should involve assessing which reforms are actually possible at this stage. 
Moreover, by not advising the complete renationalisation of this policy, analysts give the mis-
taken impression that some elements of this policy actually need to be retained at EU level.
In addition, Szemlér and Eriksson (2008) show that policy-makers in all EU countries now
expect that the ongoing review will result in a significant reform of the CAP. Therefore, the
political climate may be ripe to achieve changes in this area and it is important to stress that
changes, as far as possible, should be directed at renationalising the CAP.
Some countries regard the CAP as one of the pillars of the EU and part of its identity. How-
ever, this is by no means a feeling that is shared throughout the EU.
No positive leverage effects were identified.
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Step 8: Public opinion
The Eurobarometer question shows that public opinion is mixed, with 53 per cent supporting
EU action in this area. However, views differ widely among Member States. Contrary to what
could be expected, differences in views do not reflect the extent to which countries benefit
from EU funding for agriculture, but rather what role the EU should play in this area. For
example, in Finland only 19 per cent of respondents thought that the EU should have a role in
the area of agriculture, while in Denmark 72 per cent believed the EU should be active in this
area. 
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
Accountability for this policy is clearly a problem at EU level now that the policy has been
captured by lobbies (Swinnen and Van der Zee, 1993). Moreover, it is difficult for citizens to
understand the complex rules and schemes of EU agriculture funding.
Step 10: Normative justifiability
EU agricultural policies are not normatively justifiable by the EU objective of achieving
economic integration among its Member States. The single market would only justify regula-
tory policies such as those used for goods and services, but not the extensive programme of
funding and supporting agriculture that is currently in place at EU level. 
EU-level agricultural policies are not justifiable by the objective of promoting peace and
security in Europe. The preservation of the countryside and the protection of the environ-
ment are not related to those objectives; nor is social protection of farmers or support for
restructuring. 
It could be argued that since the CAP is an EU policy, the EU should be responsible for phas-
ing it out and supporting and compensating those who would lose out. This would make the
policies justifiable from a normative perspective. However, the fact that a policy has been
located at EU level is not in itself a justification for the EU level having to phase it out; this
would be making the same mistake twice as phasing out can be best done at national level. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
Since the CAP is a common policy, from a legal perspective it should not need to fulfil the
requirements of subsidiarity. However, as argued in section 2, this should not exempt policies
from this analysis.
Step 12: Proportionality
Given that the objectives of the CAP are not actually being met by its policies, this criterion
cannot be applied.
3.2.2 Cohesion policy
Short description
Cohesion policy aims to help the poorest countries and regions in the
EU to catch up with the EU average and accounts for approximately 35
per cent of the total EU budget. This policy has two parts: cohesion fund-
ing – funds given to countries (Member States whose GDP is below
90 per cent of the EU average), and structural funding – funds given to
regions. The Structural Funds receive most of the funding – approximately
80 per cent – and only the remaining 20 per cent goes to the Cohesion
Fund (European Commission, 2009). 
There are three Structural Funds: convergence funds, which benefit regions
with GDP per capita below 75 per cent of the EU average (accounting for
around 77 per cent of the Structural Funds); employment funds, which go
to all types of regions, rich or poor, to promote employment (accounting
for around 20 per cent); and territorial cooperation funds to promote cross-
border cooperation through multi-country projects (accounting for only
about 3 per cent of structural funds).
Main results
The parts of cohesion policy directed at the poorest Member States and
aimed at increasing economic growth in those countries are justified, both
by fiscal federalism (as this can be done efficiently at EU level) and by an
analysis based on legitimacy (as promoting economic cohesion can be con-
sidered an EU function). Conversely, where cohesion funding is given to
regions in the wealthier Member States and for goals other than promoting
growth, this is not supported by the analysis.
This study would therefore advise phasing out the funds for regional com-
petitiveness and employment (including the European Social Fund) and for
territorial cooperation. There would be two options then. The first would
be to adopt a “country focus” instead of a “regional focus”, by phasing out
the Structural Funds (which go to regions) and using the amount saved to
increase the Cohesion Fund (which goes to countries). The other solution
would be to keep both the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund, but to
earmark Structural Funds for regions in the less wealthy Member States. 
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Box 2  Analysis applied to cohesion policy
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
The fiscal federalism literature generally justifies cohesion policy as the price for the single
market, which itself is justified by fiscal federalism (Persson et al., 1996). Two reasons are
given for this: firstly, cohesion policy was created as a way to compensate for any potential
negative effects of the single market on the poorest countries. Secondly, cohesion policy –
by making the EU economies converge and more homogenous, and by making the EU on
average more productive – benefits the single market. 
However, concerning the first point, it is now clear that the poorest countries have benefited
from European economic integration, so cohesion policy can no longer be justified on those
grounds. On the second point, convergence of EU economies can indeed benefit the single
market and so this effect, despite being indirect, can be seen as justification for the policy. 
However, this paper argues that the main justification for cohesion policy is that of meeting
an EU-wide equity goal: allowing poorer countries to catch up with the average, so that all
Member States attain the same level of prosperity. This would justify claims that cohesion
policy should benefit only the poorest countries rather than the poorest regions. The section
on the political issues will analyse the desirability of this goal.
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Step 2: Funding or regulation
This policy is based on funding. However, as will be argued in Step 7, the regulations
attached to the funding can be as important as the funding itself. 
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
To date, the empirical literature assessing the efficiency of the EU Cohesion Policy has found
mixed results (see, for example, de la Fuente, 2002). Nunez Ferrer 2007 argues that this is
due to cost-efficiency being high in countries able to make the most of the Structural Funds
by implementing effective planning and implementation procedures (for example, Spain and
Ireland) and low in countries that were unable to do so. 
Several authors argue that the policy could be made considerably more efficient by changing
the current “regional focus” into a “country focus”. At present the poorest regions of each
Member State receive funding and therefore even the richest EU countries receive funding for
their poorest regions. This is undesirable as it would be more efficient if the richest Member
States financed their own lagging regions. Therefore, cohesion policy can potentially be more
efficient than it is at present (see, for example, Sapir et al., 2003).
The issue of whether the European Commission should give money to national governments
or regional governments can also be related to deeper questions about the role of the EU. It
can be argued that the members of the EU are countries, not regions, and therefore money
should go to national governments who would then decide how to distribute it. However,
others may argue that the EU is responsible for its citizens and can therefore give money to
any level of government. This debate goes beyond the scope of this study, but it is relevant to
mention it as it will be part of any decision on this issue.
In addition, according to Nunez Ferrer (2007; p. 29) structural funds have suffered from
the EU’s “pork-barrel approach to funding allocation”, as funding has often been given to
countries for political reasons. He also points out that the auditing of the funding programmes
should be improved to ensure that funding is being spent correctly. 
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
By definition, cohesion policy must be undertaken at EU level. The question addressed by
fiscal federalism, therefore, is not at what level this policy should be located, but how much,
if any, EU funding should be dedicated to it. 
Most of the fiscal federalism literature simply considers cohesion policy as necessary for the
single market and therefore justifies this policy using the same arguments used to justify the
single market. However, this report considers that this policy is meeting an equity goal and so
the analysis is different.
Fiscal federalism cannot be used to assess the desirability of the equity goal of redistributing
funds from the richest to the poorest countries in the EU, as this theory is only designed
to measure relative efficiency. However, it can be used to assess whether the programmes
funded by the Cohesion Fund could be more efficient if an individual Member State were
paying for those programmes itself. When funding is allocated to poorer EU countries and
allows for programmes that these countries would not be able to afford themselves, gains in
efficiency can result. Conversely, wealthy EU countries would be best placed to fund their
own policies. 
Step 5: Heterogeneity 
This does not apply here as the reason for a cohesion policy is precisely the fact that prosperity
levels differ in and between EU Member States.
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
This report argues that a second-best setting shows why it is best to fund programmes for
infrastructure leading to economic growth at EU level. In the absence of cohesion funds,
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governments will often allocate public spending to areas that are politically more rewarding
than those needed to increase economic growth – both because they have more immediate
positive effects and because they are more popular. Cohesion funds, with their requirement of
being co-funded by the national budgets, will provide an incentive for national governments
to put money into creating the right infrastructure for growth.
Persson et al. (1996) point out that cohesion policy suffers from a moral hazard problem,
because countries and regions receive fewer funds as their GDP moves closer to the EU
average.
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Cohesion policy is a good example of the leveraging effect of the EU budget and, in some
countries, has led to very good results in terms of improved economic growth; these are
countries that have created a strategy to improve their infrastructure based on the EU funding
(Nunez Ferrer, 2007). Therefore these results are due not so much to the money itself but
more to how the availability of that money has led to countries refocusing their policy-
making strategies. 
As regards the promotion of EU values, cohesion policy is also the best example of “solidarity”
between Member States, which can be considered one of the non-quantifiable objectives of
the EU and its budget, and one of the ideals that the EU seeks to promote. 
Concerning political realities, although the analysis has shown that cohesion policy should
benefit only the poorest countries and regions in the EU, this reform will be difficult due to
the principle of “juste retour”; countries expect to get back a fair share of the money they pay
into the EU budget and therefore expect to benefit from this policy. 
As for the possible use of the EU budget as a tool to make the EU more popular and visible,
cohesion policy can be seen as a way to improve the popularity of the EU in the countries
that benefit from it. 
Step 8: Public opinion
The Eurobarometer survey indicates that 64 per cent of the EU population supports this policy
at EU level. Again, great differences are found between the Member States, although less than
for agriculture. For example, while in Cyprus 85 per cent of those interviewed supported EU
policies to support lagging regions, in the UK only 56 per cent of respondents said they did. 
Again, differences in views were not related to how much countries benefit from cohesion
policy. For example, although the Netherlands is among the largest contributors to the EU
budget in relative terms, it was also one of the strongest supporters with 84% of respondents
in favour of the policy. At the same time, even though southern Italy benefits extensively
from EU funding for regional policy, Italy was least in favour of EU action in this area, with
only 53% supporting the policy.
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
Although this is one of the most visible EU-level policies, there is considerable scope for
greater transparency in the way projects are evaluated and audited (Nunez Ferrer, 2007). 
Step 10: Normative justifiability
If cohesion policy could be justified by being a necessary condition for the successful single
market, it would have normative justifiability according to the definition in this study. How-
ever, it was argued that this is not the case, as the justification is redistribution between the
Member States. 
It could be considered that since the objective of the EU is not the single market per se but
prosperity in Europe, cohesion policy contributes to prosperity by stimulating economic
growth in the regions and countries where it is implemented. 
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Step 11: Subsidiarity
Cohesion policy is not an area of exclusive competence of the EU and thus, legally, it must
pass the fiscal federalism test. It was found that it is difficult to apply these theories to this
policy because by definition it must be undertaken at EU level; however, a second-best
analysis indicates the gains in efficiency associated with this policy. 
Step 12: Proportionality
Not all cohesion funding is used directly for its stated objective, that is, enabling the poorest
parts of the EU to catch up with the EU average. Clearly, the same objective could therefore
be achieved with less funding.
3.2.3 Communication
Short description
The European Commission dedicates one of its Directorates-General to
communication between the EU and its citizens. Its objectives are to
inform people about the EU, to sound out public opinion on the EU and to
make the EU more democratic by involving its citizens. In addition,
although this is not explicitly stated by the Commission, it can be argued
that this policy is also used as a means to make the EU more popular. The
amount of funding dedicated to these activities is very small, correspond-
ing to only 0.07 per cent of the budget.
Main results
Communication policy is justified at EU level but its efficiency is
hampered by the difficulty of devising a single strategy for many very dif-
ferent countries. EU communication policy should be made more efficient
by adapting it to each country. This report suggests keeping funding at the
same (low) level but making better use of the funds.
Box 3  Analysis applied to communication
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal 
As argued in Section 2 of this report, public intervention to improve the transparency of the
EU and its communication with citizens is justified by a market failure: understanding of the
EU by its citizens is a public good. However, this market failure justifies spending to make
the EU more understandable, not more popular. 
Step 2: Funding or regulation
Activities to communicate the EU require funding rather than regulation.
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
Actions undertaken by the EU in this field have so far been inefficient, as shown by the
continuing lack of understanding of the EU among its citizens. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to look at how these activities could be improved, but spending in this area is clearly
only justified if it yields results.
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Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
There are two issues to consider: whether communication policy is justified and whether it
should be placed at EU level. While fiscal federalism could justify communication policy as a
prerequisite for reaping the benefits of the EU, it is unclear whether it should be at EU level
or national level. 
There are clear economies of scale in allocating this policy to EU level as it then only needs
to be undertaken once. Externalities are not significant, however, as the spheres of communi-
cation and media are separate in each country and thus a communication strategy in one
country will generally not impact the other.
Step 5: Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity problems are considerable. In addition to language barriers, significant cultural
differences mean that communication that works in one country does not necessarily work in
another. 
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
At national level, politicians do not have an incentive to make the EU more transparent.
In fact, the opposite may be true as they can then lay the blame for unpopular policies on
Brussels. This would justify keeping communication policy in Brussels.
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget 
As argued in Section 2 of this report, spending a small percentage of the EU budget on
improving citizens’ understanding of the EU may be a justifiable way to make the EU more
legitimate and democratic. However, spending to make the EU more popular is not justified. 
It could also be argued that the communication policy of the EU should aim not only to
improve transparency and democracy but also to promote European identity. However, not all
would agree that this is a worthy goal. 
This report will argue that funding for communication should stay at approximately the same
level, which is politically realistic as maintaining the status quo is the easiest option.
Leverage issues are not relevant here as this is only an EU-focused policy.
Step 8: Popular opinion
The Eurobarometer’s subsidiarity question does not include communication.
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
The existence of a communication policy for the EU is precisely justified by reasons of
procedural legitimacy. This is a policy that by nature seeks publicity and where accountability
is not a problem at EU or national level. 
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Communication is not one of the objectives of the EU but it could be regarded as the price to
pay for the benefits we derive from the EU. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
The fiscal federalism analysis has not made a clear case for communication policy being at
EU rather than national level. 
Step 12: Proportionality
The funding needed to achieve these goals is proportionately very small since communication
activities do not require as many resources as other areas of spending.
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3.2.4 Consumer and health policy
Short description
Consumer protection is the other side of the economic integration coin as a
single market requires common standards for the protection of consumers.
At EU level, health and consumer protection form one policy area because
health action focuses mainly on consumer protection from health hazards
since health systems have remained national. Therefore, EU action on
health is very different from national policy-making in this area.
In budgetary terms, consumer and health programmes amount to only 0.4
per cent of total EU spending. Most of this relates to consumer safety and
public health, through EU regulatory agencies and scientific committees
(approximately 0.3 per cent of the budget). Little more than 0.01 per cent
of the budget goes to consumer education. 
Main results
Some funding is needed to back the regulatory activities in this area and
some very limited consumer education programmes that can be conducted
efficiently at EU level. This study therefore proposes that funding should
remain at the same level.
Box 4  Analysis applied to consumer and health policy
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Public health and safety are public goods, so they cannot be efficiently provided by the
market; this justifies public intervention. Consumer protection is also justified by the market
failure of imperfect information: if consumers are not well informed about products, they
cannot make good decisions about what to buy and how much they are willing to pay for
each product.
Step 2: Funding or regulation
These government interventions rely mostly on regulation to enforce health and safety
standards, inform consumers about the products available to them and safeguard their rights
when they are not satisfied. However, some limited funding is justified to finance the
monitoring and prevention of health and safety risks. Funding is also required to finance
consumer education initiatives and institutions to guarantee the protection of consumer rights
although as noted later, this should mainly be at national level.
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
The cost of these policies is low and EU action so far has mainly focused on regulation rather
than funding. 
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
Due to the single market, goods can circulate freely between the Member States. This justi-
fies the centralisation of programmes to monitor health and safety standards in relation to
food and other products. Moreover, the single market makes common standards for consumer
protection necessary. The externalities, therefore, are very large. 
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Consumer education, however, would best be carried out at national level. Cultural differences
need to be taken into account and the associations for consumer protection are national. For
this reason, there is little justification for funding consumer education programmes at EU level.
Step 5: Heterogeneity
As no significant differences in preferences exist concerning health and safety standards,
heterogeneity is not a problem. However, other aspects of consumer protection, such as
information requirements, reveal large differences in preferences among the Member States
(Figueira, 2007). Legislation in this area entails a cost for the industry and therefore the
correct balance must be found; countries have different views on where that balance lies.
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
If in some EU countries there is a sub-optimal level of consumer protection, EU action in this
area could help solve that inefficiency. 
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Here also, defendants of a European social model could argue that this includes providing a
high level of consumer protection in Europe but as seen above, the existence of such a model
is debatable, as EU countries have very different social schemes.
Political feasibility is not a problem; this study advocates maintaining the current level of
reduced spending.
Step 8: Political opinion
Public opinion is mixed, at 53 per cent, and once again reflects the disparity of opinion
between Member States. In Cyprus, for example, 74 per cent of those interviewed want the
EU to play a role in consumer protection while in Finland only 38 per cent do. 
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
This policy is very visible at EU level, partly as the EU uses it deliberately as a way to show
that it is “on the side” of the consumers. For this reason, there are no major accountability
problems.
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Common action in terms of health and safety standards is justified by the single market.
Concerning other aspects of consumer policy, while they are closely related to the single
market, this only justifies regulation to create a level playing field and not necessarily fund-
ing programmes.
Step 11: Subsidiarity
Funding programmes for public safety clearly pass the fiscal federalism test as they can be
more efficient at EU level. 
Step 12: Proportionality
The funding needed for these programmes is relatively very small. 
3.2.5 Culture
Short description
The percentage of the EU budget dedicated to cultural policies is very
small – only 0.24 per cent of the budget. The visibility of these policies is
nonetheless often high because by their nature they are more appealing to
the media. 
Some of the funds go to a seven-year framework programme to fund and
promote cross-border cultural projects as well as those seen to be promot-
ing intercultural dialogue. Some funding is also directed at young people
to promote their participation in civil society and their mobility throughout
Europe. In addition, a programme called “Media” supports European
cinema and television production. 
Main results
There are only two justifications for keeping this funding at EU level: the
second-best argument whereby funding is sub-optimal at the national level,
and the European identity argument. Together, these two arguments could
justify some very limited funding of cultural activities directly linked to
promoting cultural exchanges or language learning. Therefore, this report
suggests keeping funding at the current (low) level.
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Box 5  Analysis applied to culture
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Government action on culture can be justified by a market failure: there are positive
externalities since it can be argued that everyone benefits from a society with a high level of
culture. Moreover, culture is linked to common values and to the cohesiveness of society. 
Step 2: Funding or regulation
Intervention is mainly in terms of funding as governments subsidises artists and cultural
activities. 
Step3: Cost-effectiveness
The cost-effectiveness of public intervention in culture is by nature difficult to assess. How-
ever, it is clear that officials in Brussels cannot be best placed to allocate funding in this area
in different national cultural scenes. Funding will thus be less efficient at EU level except in
the case of cross-border programmes.
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
Member States have different cultural scenes that do not cut across borders. Therefore there
are no significant externalities or economies of scale. An exception could be the mobility of
artists and young people. 
Step 5: Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity is very large as people in different EU countries have very different cultural
tastes. 
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
If culture is considered to be under-funded in some EU countries, additional funding for
culture at EU level would alleviate that problem.
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
It can be argued that EU action in this field is needed to promote European culture and
ideals. However, this is controversial: while some see the EU as a union based on a common
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culture and believe that the preservation and promotion of that culture is a worthy goal, others
would oppose using EU money for this purpose. A solution could be to keep this funding low. 
The proposal offered in this paper to keep this funding at its current very low level is
politically realistic. 
Step 8: Public opinion
The subsidiarity question does not include culture.
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
Although culture is one of the areas where the EU seeks to publicise its activities, the
accountability of these culture programmes can be lower than at national level; spending at
EU level is generally less scrutinised than at national level, particularly when the sums of
money are relatively small.
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Culture is not linked to either the single market or to peace in Europe, so it is not justified
under this definition. Programmes that promote mobility are the exceptions. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
Culture is not a common policy so it must pass the test. It was shown that fiscal federalism
does not support this policy at EU level unless we consider the second-best argument that it is
under-funded at national level. Therefore, it cannot be said to clearly pass the test.
Step 12: Proportionality
The funding needed is very small.
3.2.6 Development policy
Short description
EU development policy is part of EU action on external policies and closely
related to foreign affairs and trade policies. The current strategy underlying
the policy is spelled out in the 2005 European Consensus for Develop-
ment, a joint statement by the EU institutions and the Member States
setting out the main objectives of EU development policy (European
Commission, 2005). The Consensus identifies nine main areas of action:
trade and regional integration; environment; infrastructure, communica-
tions and transport; water and energy; rural development and food security;
governance, democracy and human rights; conflict prevention; human
development; and social cohesion and employment. 
Development policy accounts for approximately 2.7 per cent of the budget.
In addition, Member States provide funding for the European Development
Fund (EDF), which is outside the EU budget. The EDF amounts to EUR
22 682 million for the 2008-2013 period and is mainly allocated to the
Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries; these are often countries with
which some EU Member States have historical ties. 
Main results
There is a contradiction between the analysis based on efficiency and the
analysis based on legitimacy. While it is clearly more efficient to have a
common policy for development, this is not clearly supported by normative
justifiability as it is does not contribute directly to peace and prosperity in
Europe. Nonetheless, the policy is part of the EU foreign policy, which
itself is closer to the EU objectives as defined in this study. Therefore, as
the gains in efficiency from centralising this policy are very high, this
report proposes a significant increase in spending on development. 
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Box 6  Analysis applied to development policy
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Development policies have an equity goal: solidarity between people in the EU and people in
other countries. In addition, development policy also contributes to foreign and defence
policy objectives as reducing poverty in developing countries can, for example, contribute to
conflict prevention and the control of immigration flows. 
Step 2: Funding or regulation
Development policy is essentially based on funding given to poor countries. However, as we
will see below, conditions for funding are the most important factor.
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
All aspects of EU foreign policy – including development policy – suffer from a generally
recognised problem of a lack of coordination between different programmes and structures
(Juncos, 2009); this makes the policies less efficient. In addition, the negative impact of the
CAP on developing countries is more significant than the positive impact of development
policies. 
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
The literature generally advises allocation at the EU level for this policy for the same reasons
that apply to foreign and defence policy.
Economies of scale are high as the success of development policy depends on it being a
leverage for improvements in policy-making in the developing country. Therefore, if all
Member States combine their assistance and their country strategies, their leverage will be
higher and so will the chances of success. Working together also allows Member States to
pool their experience. 
Concerning externalities, if countries have different development policies and do not co-
ordinate them, different strategies may well have unintended effects on each other. Common
policies allow these externalities to be internalised, making the policies more efficient. 
Step 5: Heterogeneity
Member States differ on which countries they view as priority countries, which is mainly due
to different historical ties between countries. For example, some Member States may feel a
duty to help countries that were formally their colony or countries that speak their language.
However, there are also several regions that all Member States want to help develop and there
is broad consensus on the type of development assistance seen as most cost-effective.
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Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
If we consider that the funding dedicated to development at national level is insufficient,
locating part of this policy at the EU level could help increase that funding. National spend-
ing on development is currently below the international commitments made at international
conferences. In particular, countries are far from meeting their commitment to increase
development assistance to 0.7 per cent of their GNP by 2015, part of the agreement on the
Millennium Development Goals.
Moreover, locating this policy at EU level could allow it to be better implemented as it is
separate from the national foreign policy objectives. 
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Development policy is not directly linked to economic integration. As it is part of foreign
policy, it is related to maintaining peace in Europe but this link could be seen as too indirect
to justify common policies.
Concerning political feasibility, this section will show that development funding should be
significantly increased. However, such a proposal is likely to be opposed; firstly because it
requires decreased funding in other areas, and secondly because just as governments are
reluctant to meet their full international commitments at national level, they are equally likely
to oppose meeting the commitments also at EU level. 
Leverage effects are relevant for this policy – not for EU countries, but for the recipients of
aid. The most important aspect of development policy is not the funding itself but the
changes in policy-making that it leads to in the recipient countries. 
Step 8: Public opinion
The Eurobarometer subsidiarity question does not include development policy.
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
As development policy does not affect the citizens of the donor country directly, it is not as
scrutinised by the general public as other policy areas; this can lead to less accountability. 
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Development policy could be said to have a positive impact on the security of Europe since
poverty is often at the root of conflict. This policy could therefore have a positive impact on
world stability, which itself would benefit stability in the EU. However, this effect is very
indirect. Therefore, development policy is not clearly supported by normative justifiability. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
The fiscal federalism test clearly shows that this policy can be more efficient at EU level than
at national level, both according to traditional fiscal federalism due to economies of scale (as
this policy is more efficient as a joint EU policy) and according to second generation fiscal
federalism, if we consider that spending is sub-optimal at national level given that countries
are not meeting their international commitments.
Step 12: Proportionality
Spending on development is currently low and this study argues that it should be increased.
3.2.7 Education 
Short description
Analyses of the EU budget often group together education and research.
However, these are two separate issues as evidenced by the fact that at
national level they are often dealt with by different ministries. This study
includes under the heading of education primary and secondary education,
training and life-long learning.
The EU has so far intervened very little in the field of education. The
main initiatives are programmes directed at promoting the mobility of
students, the most well-known being the ERASMUS programme. Others
include programmes for life-long learning and language learning. Funding
in this area accounts for 0.7 per cent of the budget.
Main results
The analysis shows that funding for education at EU level is only justified
if it is used for programmes to promote the mobility of workers within the
EU or to promote language learning. As this is currently the case, it is
proposed that funding should remain at the same level.
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Box 7  Analysis applied to education
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Public intervention in education is justified mainly by an equity goal: ensuring that everyone
has equal access to education. In addition, certain market failures make it difficult for the
market to provide education, for example, capital market imperfections. In theory, families
may borrow to invest in their children’s education, but in practice they may not be willing to
undertake such a commitment.
Step 2: Funding or regulation
Government intervention is based both on funding and regulation, and also on direct govern-
ment provision of education, in the case of public institutions. 
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
Given that EU intervention has been so limited, it is hard to judge its cost-effectiveness. How-
ever, programmes for mobility are widely regarded as being successful (Sapir et al., 2003).
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
The literature on fiscal federalism generally groups education with research, obtaining mixed
conclusions. Given that education systems and traditions differ widely, in practice an EU-level
policy would not lead to any economies of scale. In theory, however, there could be exter-
nalities as education influences growth and European economies are interlinked. But this
effect is too indirect to justify centralisation.
However, for programmes promoting the mobility of people in Europe, externalities are
significant due to the need for mobility of workers within the single market (Persson et al.,
1996).
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Step 5: Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity is very significant as countries have different preferences and traditions as
regards their education systems (Alesina et al., 2001). 
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
The existence of programmes for education at EU level can help tackle the insufficient
mobility of workers between EU countries. Programmes such as the existing ERASMUS pro-
gramme (which finances university students who want to study in another Member State for
up to one academic year) are particularly useful in this respect.
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Language programmes and promoting intercultural exchanges can be considered part of
promoting European identity. This can be seen as justification for these programmes being
provided by the EU.
Step 8: Public opinion
Public opinion is clearly opposed to education policy at EU level; only 32 per cent of respon-
dents favour any EU action in this area. Opposition was strongest in the UK, where only 16
per cent supported any EU intervention in education systems.
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
If parts of primary and secondary education were transferred to EU level, people would
probably begin to follow policy-making at EU level more closely as these are areas that affect
them directly. It is therefore likely that procedural legitimacy would be high. 
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Education is not directly related to economic integration or maintaining security in Europe.
The exceptions, again, are programmes directed at mobility as they are directly related to
economic integration. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
Education is not a common policy and therefore must pass the test. The fiscal federalism
analysis does not support this policy at EU level except for programmes promoting mobility.
Step 12: Proportionality
It was seen that funding education at EU level is only justified if it is directly aimed at
mobility and possibly also directed at language learning and promoting intercultural skills.
The existing programmes in these areas require little funding. 
3.2.8 Employment and social affairs 
Short description
These policies have been mainly national policies. At EU level, most
action has involved coordinating national policies and ensuring a level play-
ing field, which is seen as desirable due to the free movement of people in
the EU. However, there is also a limited amount of funding at EU level.
The PROGRESS Programme (Programme for Employment and Social
Security) and the Globalisation Adjustment Fund – used in cases where
people are made redundant due to structural changes – together amount to
only 0.5 per cent of the budget. However, in addition to this limited spend-
ing, cohesion funding includes the European Social Fund (ESF), which is
considerably larger in terms of funding implications (7.9%). 
Main results
This section will show that spending on employment, social affairs and
health is not justified at EU level and also that existing programmes are
inefficient. However, there is a strong ideological conviction in some
countries that EU economic policies must be complemented by social
policies at EU level. This implies that it would be politically unrealistic
not to have them. Nonetheless, this issue can be solved partly through
“soft” policies such as schemes to compare Member States’ policies and
voluntary coordination.
Therefore the proposal is to reduce spending in these areas to a small
operational amount, to support the voluntary coordination of national
policies and a limited number of programmes needed to complement EU
level legislation. Concerning the European Social Fund, it should be
phased out and replaced by additional funding for other, more efficient,
cohesion funds. 
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Box 8  Analysis applied to employment and social affairs
Step 1: Equity or market failure 
These policies have equity as their main aim: redistributing funds from wealthier to poorer
people, and ensuring that everyone has access to certain services and to a certain standard of
living. However, they can also target market failures, providing goods that are not sufficiently
provided by the market and promoting full employment.
Step 2: Funding or regulation
These policies have large funding implications and represent the largest share of spending at
national level. However, regulation also plays a major role, including trade union laws, salary
negotiations and labour laws regulating the mechanisms for hiring and firing workers. More-
over, at EU level, soft law has played a major role in this policy, allowing Member States to
compare policies.
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness 
Due to the large differences between the EU countries’ economic and social systems, it is
more efficient to run these policies at national level (Sapir, 2005). In particular, the cost-
efficiency of the ESF is clearly sub-optimal as the European Commission is not best placed
to manage employment programmes at national level. 
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities 
Fiscal federalism theory would normally recommend the centralisation of social and employ-
ment policy (Musgrave, 1959). This would eliminate tax competition between the jurisdic-
tions, the idea being that since people can move between jurisdictions, they would move to
where taxes are lowest. This would lead to a “race to the bottom” as jurisdictions compete to
have the lowest taxes. This can be considered an externality because it is an effect that a policy
in one jurisdiction has on other jurisdictions. However, this problem is not relevant in the EU
because mobility of people between countries is very low (Hoeller et al., 1996).
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Further, providing social security at a centralised level can be considered more efficient
because it allows for a pooling of risk: if economic conditions worsen in one jurisdiction,
requiring more social security payments, this could be financed by other jurisdictions where
economic conditions are better. However, this would only be relevant in the EU if the EU
budget were much larger.
Regarding policies for retraining workers and helping them find employment: although a
positive externality is involved because high levels of employment strengthen growth which
also benefits other countries, this effect is very indirect and does not compensate for the large
heterogeneity problems involved. 
Step 5: Heterogeneity
The literature generally advises that these policies be kept at the national level mainly
because of the heterogeneity of preferences. EU countries have different preferences concern-
ing social security provision, due both to different economic conditions and to different views
on the role of the state. 
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
Second generation fiscal federalism also advises that these policies be kept at national level.
Under the current political system in the EU, it would be difficult to have centralised
decision-making on this issue as all funding at EU level is subject to negotiations in which
each country focuses on getting as much funding as possible from the EU. On the other hand,
Persson et al. (1996) argue that labour market regulations are often excessive in EU countries
due to the influence of unions, so any tax competition could actually have a positive impact
by bringing down the level of regulations.
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
It is often argued that the promotion of social equity is part of EU ideals; the EU can be seen
as the promoter of a “European social model” where, unlike the US, social protection is more
prevalent. It can also be argued that the prosperity derived from EU economic integration can
only benefit society if it is combined with social policies to ensure that everyone benefits
from that prosperity. 
This paper disagrees with these two points. Concerning the “European social model”, the
social security systems of EU Member States are in fact extremely different – their only
common characteristic is that they all offer more social protection than the US system. In
practice, it is only possible to talk about European social models in the plural (Sapir, 2005).
The differences are so large that it would be impossible to implement social policies at EU
level without having to ignore the views of a great number of people.
Concerning the second point, it is true that EU economic policies must go hand in hand with
social protection, but social protection can be best provided by each country at national level.
Instead of transferring money for social policies to be implemented at EU level, countries can
keep that money and spend it on social policies to balance the economic changes caused by
the EU and do so in a way that is adapted to the needs of the country. 
However, the debate on whether social policy should be an EU level policy is highly ideo-
logical. Although the analysis has shown that it would be more efficient and more legitimate
to keep funding of social policies at national level, many would argue that since the EU has a
role in altering the economic structure of the Member States, a social policy must come with
it. France, for example, regards social policy as an essential part of EU activity.
This explains why, despite very limited EU action in this field, a number of high-profile
policies give the impression that the EU is highly involved in social policy. One example is
the Globalisation Adjustment Fund. This fund can be seen as a way for the EU to show that
its activities in terms of trade and free markets are balanced by support to those affected by
economic restructuring. 
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Step 8: Public opinion
Public opinion is very largely opposed to transferring welfare policies to the EU level.
According to the Eurobarometer survey, only 34 per cent of the population support having
some aspects of social policies at EU level. The estimate falls to 24 per cent for policies
regarding pensions. This may reflect a wish to retain control over policies that affect citizens
most directly. It may also be related to the fact that citizens are generally not comfortable
with the thought of transferring too much of their tax money to EU level.
This opposition is strongest in the Nordic countries, probably because their social models
differ substantially from those of other EU countries and they do not want the EU to alter
them. 
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
As in the case of education, it is suggested that accountability would be high at EU level as
these areas are followed closely by citizens since they affect people’s daily lives. On the other
hand, these are areas where a very high degree of procedural legitimacy is demanded, and
even more if they were at EU level. 
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Social policy is not directly related to either the single market or to ensuring peace and
security in Europe. The exceptions are aspects of social security related to the mobility of
workers, such as social security arrangements regarding the possibility of transferring
pensions from one country to another, for example. However, these have mainly regulatory
rather than spending implications. In addition, as seen above, some would argue that social
security is the other side of the single market coin; this paper argues that this other side of the
coin does not need to be at EU level but rather at national level. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
These policies are not exclusive competences of the EU and therefore must pass the fiscal
federalism test. This test was not conclusive for the EU and in general indicated that these
policies should remain at national level. 
Step 12: Proportionality
It can be concluded from the previous steps that only a small amount of funding is required
to fund programmes that allow the comparison and voluntary coordination of national
schemes or that support legislation in this field. 
3.2.9 Enterprise and industry
Short description
This policy area focuses on a country’s industry and includes promoting
the productivity of firms or helping certain sectors and small businesses.
At EU level, this policy includes both support for SMEs and ensuring that
the internal market is working well for specific sectors. Funding amounts
to only 0.2 per cent of the budget.
Main results
EU-level support for SMEs can have a positive effect in compensating for
the sub-optimal provision of private and/or government funding in some
EU countries. However, several policies can be implemented more
efficiently at national level. Nonetheless, current funding is very small and
results could potentially improve if it were increased. Therefore this report
advises only a moderate increase in current funding. 
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Box 9  Analysis applied to enterprise and industry
Step1: Market failure or equity goal
Public intervention in this area is justified by market failures. In the case of promoting pro-
ductivity and competitiveness, there is a positive externality as intervention can potentially
benefit not only the companies concerned but all companies and society as a whole. In the
case of helping small businesses, specific market failures need to be addressed, such as
imperfect credit markets that make it difficult for businesses to obtain credit. 
Step 2: Funding or regulation
This policy involves both regulation and funding. Regulation at EU level focuses on creating
a level playing field for industry in Europe. Funding is also justified to compensate for
market failures (for example, grants for SMEs). 
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
Nunez Ferrer (2007) argues that this policy should be made more efficient by focusing on
countries that have a sub-optimal provision of funding for SMEs, as in the others it would be
best to use national funds and private finance.
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
No economies of scale can be achieved by locating this policy at EU level; the national level
ensures its efficiency. Externalities are not significant. 
Given the existence of the single market, support for industry should be harmonised to
achieve a level playing field. However, this only justifies common regulations but funding
could be national. 
Step 5: Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity is not significant as EU economies are similar and therefore have similar needs
in terms of industrial policy.
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
A second-best setting can justify EU-level intervention; for example, if funding for SMEs is
insufficient at national level this can be compensated by funding at EU level.
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
SME policy at EU level can have a positive leverage effect when it leads national govern-
ments to improve their policies in this area.
This policy is not related to EU values. The proposal in this paper, to keep funding stable, is
politically realistic.
Step 8: Public opinion
Enterprise policy is not mentioned in the Eurobarometer subsidiarity question.
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
This policy is visible and transparent.
Step 10: Normative justifiability
It can be considered that the promotion of industrial competitiveness is related to economic
integration. However, the single market only requires providing a level playing field, not
common funding programmes. 
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Step 11: Subsidiarity
This is not a common policy. The fiscal federalism analysis shows that this policy can be best
undertaken at national level, except for in countries where this policy is currently sub-
optimal. 
Step 12: Proportionality
Given that EU intervention here is mainly justified to compensate for sub-optimal provision
of funding for SMEs in certain Member States, the optimal level of funding in theory is
equivalent to the size of the gap to be filled.
3.2.10 Environmental policy 
Short description
Spending on the environment at EU level is very limited at present and
accounts for only 0.2 per cent of the budget. Most of the spending goes to
the LIFE+ financial instrument, which finances projects and technologies
to protect the environment and deal with climate change. Funding also
goes to the European Environmental Agency. However, funding for
environmental policies also comes from other sections of the budget, mainly
cohesion funding and research.
Main results
This study proposes increased funding for environmental issues that are
international and common to all Member States (and thus where large
gains in efficiency can be made through cooperation) as opposed to mainly
local or national issues where heterogeneity in preferences will be high. 
However, it is argued that it is more efficient to earmark other areas of the
budget so that they target environmental goals rather than significantly
increasing the spending on environmental policies. Only a moderate
increase in spending is advised. 
Box 10  Analysis applied to environmental policy
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Environmental policy is justified by a market failure: negative externalities. When a factory
causes pollution, this has a negative impact on society for which the factory does not bear the
cost. Moreover, a clean environment can be considered as a public good, as it is non-rival
(one person benefiting from it does not reduce another person’s benefit) and non-excludable
(we cannot charge people for benefiting from it, as we cannot exclude those who have not
paid the charge). Therefore, it must be provided by the government.
Step 2: Funding or regulation
Environmental policy should include both funding and regulation. Regulations can be used to
ban or limit activities that damage the environment, or to make those who are causing
damage to the environment bear some of the cost. Funding can be used, for example, to
subsidise technologies that have a positive impact on the environment. In addition, taxation
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plays an important role as governments can use taxes and tax exemptions to incentivise
companies to use less polluting technologies.
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
Spending programmes with international implications can be efficient at EU level but
programmes dealing with local issues add less to the national activities (Hoeller et al., 1996).
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities 
Traditional fiscal federalism defends the centralisation of environmental policies due to the
existence of large negative externalities among the Member States. Environmental policy is
the classic example of a policy with externalities, as many environmental issues (for example,
climate change and air and water pollution) are transnational in character. However, several
other problems are not subject to externalities, such as the preservation of certain areas within
a country or urban pollution. These externalities are not only constituted by the environmental
effects themselves but by distortions to the single market caused by different environmental
standards. 
Step 5: Heterogeneity
There is large heterogeneity in the preferences towards levels of environmental protection (for
example, while in some EU countries the environment is one of the population’s main
concerns, in others it is a less important issue). The importance given to the preservation of
the environment, and the willingness to pay for it via taxes, varies widely across the EU. 
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
In areas where national environmental policies are not efficient, cooperation could lead to
gains in efficiency.
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Some would consider that a high degree of environmental protection is part of the European
social model. However, as mentioned above, the notion of there being a European social
model is highly debatable.
The proposal of this study, to increase funding in this area only slightly but to earmark funds
in other areas, is politically feasible. 
Concerning leverage effects, cross-border cooperation on environmental protection could help
spread best practices and make policies more efficient.
Step 8: Public opinion
Public opinion strongly supports an environmental policy at EU level (64% of respondents).
This may be due to the perception that environmental issues are transnational and should be
tackled jointly. Views on this differ very little between the countries.
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
Environment is a policy area that is generally understood by people and followed by the
media so it is likely that the same would happen at EU level. Some environmental issues
attract a great deal of media and public attention (for example climate change) while others
do not (for example soil and marine pollution).
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Concerning normative justifiability, environmental policies are related to the single market
only in cases where there is a need to have a common regulation at EU level, because if each
country has its own different regulation it would create an obstacle to cross-border trade
under the single market. For example, harmonisation at EU level on the types of chemicals
allowed in products is justifiable under this definition but regulations on the protection of
animal species are not. 
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Environmental policy is not related to peace and prosperity in Europe, except in the case of
environmental threats. If climate change is seen as a security threat, this could justify
common action in this area. 
The legitimacy analysis therefore complements the standard analysis by suggesting that
environmental policies should generally only be transferred to the EU level if they are directly
related to the single market. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
Environmental policy is not an exclusive competence and therefore must pass the fiscal
federalism test. The test shows clearly that environmental policy can be more efficient in
areas involving international cooperation, such as climate change, but in other areas this is
less clear.
Step 12: Proportionality
Spending on the environment is currently very low at EU level. However, as seen in Step 2,
government intervention in this area consists largely of taxation and tax breaks to affect the
incentives of companies; this must be done at national level. Moreover, other parts of the EU
budget contribute to environmental goals, such as research on the environment and part of the
Structural and Cohesion Funds. 
Figueira and Nunez Ferrer (2008) propose that other areas of the budget should be earmarked
so that they take into account environmental constraints. This is politically easier than
increasing spending on the environment. It could also be more efficient as it can be more
useful to ensure that all government policies provide the correct environmental incentives
rather than to create costly programmes. Adelle et al. (2008) also show that the positive
effects of the EU programmes that support environmental measures are diminished by the
existence of other EU programmes that have a negative impact on the environment. 
Nonetheless, it would also be advisable to increase funding for environmental issues that are
international and common to all Member States (and thus where large gains in efficiency can
be made through cooperation) as opposed to mainly local or national issues where hetero-
geneity in preferences will be high.
3.2.11 External relations
Short description
The activities of the EU in external relations are of three main types:
defence, relations with other countries (including diplomacy and help to
non-developing countries) and development. In this report development is
analysed separately. The total amount (excluding development) accounts
for approximately 2.7 per cent of the budget.
EU budget spending on defence is very small, accounting for only 0.13 per
cent of the budget. However, most of the EU’s common initiatives on
defence are in fact funded outside the EU budget by agreements between
the Member States. 
Concerning relations with third countries, the largest share of spending
goes to the EU Neighbourhood Policy, the part of foreign policy directed
at the countries neighbouring the EU. The second largest share goes to
pre-accession assistance, or financial support for countries in the pro-
cess of applying for EU membership. These include Croatia, Turkey and
Macedonia. The remainder is spent on diplomatic relations with other
countries. 
Main results
Ideally, given the potential for large gains in efficiency from economies
of scale, spending on external relations, and particularly defence, should
be significantly increased. However, the reality is that to have common
programmes, Member States would need to agree on common policies,
and at present their views on several issues differ considerably. 
Nonetheless, even in the areas the Member States have already agreed to
cooperate on, funding needs to be increased so that existing programmes
can receive sufficient resources. Therefore this study proposes that the
share of the EU budget dedicated to external relations and defence should
be increased significantly.
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Box 11  Analysis applied to external relations
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Public policy for external relations addresses a market failure as this policy cannot be provided
by the market: it is a public good since it is non-excludable (people cannot be excluded from
benefiting from the country’s defence and external policy, therefore they cannot be individually
charged for it) and non-rival (one person benefiting from a country’s defence policy does not
diminish the benefit to others).
Step 2: Funding or regulation
The policies for the EU’s immediate neighbours and future EU members have funding
implications as they involve help to those countries. Common policies for defence could
potentially have large funding implications if the Member States decide to further their
collaboration in this field. As for other foreign policy activities, the potential creation of an
EU diplomatic service would have funding implications. Other activities are based on regula-
tions to centralise decision-making. 
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
Given that spending on external affairs and defence at EU level is currently very low, it is
difficult to comment on its potential cost-effectiveness. However, a generally recognised
problem is the lack of coherence in these policies due to an unclear division of responsi-
bilities among the different bodies and committees dealing with foreign affairs and defence at
EU level (Juncos, 2009).
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
Traditional fiscal federalism holds that defence policies should be centralised to benefit from
economies of scale: by pooling their resources, Member States could make their defence
systems more efficient and save money by avoiding duplication (Hoeller et al., 1996). There
are also economies of scale in the areas of foreign policy not directly related to defence be-
cause by pooling their efforts Member States can improve their standing in the international
arena. Concerning relations with so-called “neighbourhood countries”, EU countries can also
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assert a much greater influence if the 27 Member States deal with neighbouring countries as
a single entity.
Step 5: Heterogeneity
The heterogeneity problem here is substantial because Member States have very different
preferences in the area of defence. For example, some countries are “neutral” while others are
members of international alliances. The solution generally advised by the literature is to pool
only the resources of the least sensitive areas (Alesina et al., 2001). 
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
Second generation fiscal federalism adds that there is a political failure at EU level that
would justify keeping this policy at national level: the incentive to free ride. Some countries
could choose to benefit from other countries’ spending without spending themselves (Persson
et al., 1996). However, the authors conclude that, nevertheless, the best solution is to further
integrate the policies while being careful to avoid this problem. 
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Although this section will argue for additional spending on foreign policy, in practice this will
be resisted. Firstly, because as with justice, freedom and security, more spending in this area
would imply either an increase in the total budget or a decrease in other areas such as agri-
culture, and secondly, because governments are reluctant to surrender their sovereignty in this
area.
The main role of EU foreign policy is to maintain peace and stability within the EU territory
through good relations with other countries and by promoting peace and stability in the rest
of the world. However, a less explicit goal of national foreign policy is to promote the
nation’s ideals in the world. At EU level, it is questionable whether this is an objective, given
that the Member States differ in the ideals that they want to export. However, Smith (2008)
argues that the EU is in practice already promoting a set of ideals and even a “grand strategy”
through its foreign policy. 
Step 8: Public opinion
Concerning public opinion, the Eurobarometer subsidiarity question shows very wide support
for defence and foreign affairs at EU level (64 per cent). This may be due to the perception
that, due to the relatively small size of EU countries, joint efforts will make EU countries
safer and more powerful in the international scene (economies of scale). 
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
Defence is an area where, even at national level, decisions are often made out of the public
eye and/or without regard to public opinion. This is due to the need for confidentiality of
information and to reasons of diplomacy and relations between countries, which often lead
governments to ignore public opinion. Therefore, this is an area in which national govern-
ments have a considerable leeway in making their decisions. While citizens accept a lower
level of accountability in this policy area at national level, it is likely that they would find this
less acceptable at EU level. 
Step 10: Normative justifiability 
Concerning normative justifiability, defence and foreign policies are related to the objective
of achieving an area of peace and security in Europe. However, “peace” was originally under-
stood mostly as internal peace – avoiding wars and conflicts between Member States. More-
over, this was to be achieved through the integration of economic interests. Therefore, if we
take the narrow definition of this objective, a common foreign policy is not justified. 
If we take a wider definition of this objective, we can conclude that there are legitimate
reasons for harmonising foreign policy and defence policy, at least in the areas most related
to achieving a climate of peace and stability in Europe. For example, external policies that
contribute to fighting international terrorism could potentially have a great direct impact on
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the security of EU citizens. Conversely, general foreign policy and diplomatic relations with
other countries are only indirectly related to security within the EU and there is therefore less
justification for action at EU level.
The analysis based on legitimacy therefore adds to the analysis based on fiscal federalism the
conclusion that there should be greater centralisation at EU level of the aspects of foreign and
defence policy most directly related to ensuring security within the EU, and where problems
of accountability are lower. This should be combined with the conclusion from first and
second generation fiscal federalism, that the areas where heterogeneity of foreign policy does
not cause a problem should be centralised to benefit from economies of scale. This implies
that the Member States should centralise at EU level the areas where they have similar
approaches, especially to deal with concrete security problems. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
This is not a common EU policy so the test must be passed. The fiscal federalism analysis is
not conclusive for most areas as on the one hand there are large economies of scale but on
the other hand there are heterogeneity problems. 
Step 12: Proportionality
It is, of course, difficult to identify the areas where the Member States have similar or diver-
gent views – particularly as this will vary constantly – and therefore it is difficult to deter-
mine the ideal level of cooperation. A solution that is being increasingly considered by the
Member States is to allow a core group of countries to step up cooperation in some areas. 
3.2.12 Justice, freedom and security
Short description
As its name indicates, EU action in this field is divided into three main
strands: justice, freedom and security. Freedom includes free movement of
persons, border controls and immigration and asylum. Security includes
the fight against crime and cooperation between national police forces.
Justice concerns judicial cooperation. Most of the spending is in the area
of freedom, particularly border controls and immigration policy. Total
spending amounts to 0.6 per cent of the budget.
Main results
The analysis leads to the conclusion that the share of the EU budget
allocated to this area should be significantly increased as funding at EU
level would be preferable in a number of areas both from the perspective
of efficiency and legitimacy.
Concerning security, EU collaboration to fight international crime and
terrorism is clearly necessary due to the opening of borders. Although
coordination of policies and exchange of information play an important
role, some programmes would be more efficient if funded and conducted
at EU level. The EU already has the infrastructure for these common pro-
grammes in the form of agencies but these would need additional funding
to play a more active role. 
As for immigration, countries have very different preferences concerning
conditions for legal immigration, how to deal with illegal immigration and
methods of integration. However, with the opening of borders, cooperation
is a necessity and therefore a common policy in this area has gradually
developed. More funding would be needed to back this policy and in
particular border protection programmes, information sharing on immigra-
tion and asylum and support for refugees. This report therefore proposes a
significant increase in spending in this area.
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Box 12  Analysis applied to justice, freedom and security
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Policies regarding the safety of citizens are justified by a market failure: safety is a public
good. Any immigration policy must by definition be publicly provided. Due to the free move-
ment of people within the EU, these policies have become EU-wide public goods.
Step 2: Funding or regulation
This area of policy-making is mainly based on legislation providing a common legal frame-
work throughout Europe. However, considerable funding is involved in fighting illegal immi-
gration (including protection of the common external borders and policing), refugee policy on
refugees, integration of legal immigrants and police cooperation. The justice area, on the
other hand, has no significant funding implications. 
There is also EU intervention at a more superficial level that consists of coordination,
exchange of information and comparison of methods and is clearly beneficial for all the
policies involved. 
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
It is difficult to judge the effectiveness of these policies at EU level as they are currently at a
very low level of spending. 
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities 
Due to the opening of the borders between the Member States (following the Schengen
Agreement), several policies now have such large externalities between countries that they
have effectively become common to all Member States (they have become “EU public
goods”). These include international crime, immigration and protection of the common
external borders of the EU. The case for centralising those policies is therefore very strong.
Other policies, however, such as the justice system or national safety issues only impact
on national or local level; they have by definition no significant externalities with other
countries.
There are clearly important economies of scale to be gained from cooperating against interna-
tional crime and terrorism, which reinforces the case to place these policies at EU level.
Step 5: Heterogeneity
In relation to immigration, heterogeneity problems are considerable as Member States have
different preferences regarding immigration policies. In the areas of international crime
and terrorism, heterogeneity problems are also present due to different police systems and
different preferences in relation to the balance between civil rights and security. 
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
If policies such as border protection are centralised, there can be an incentive for certain
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countries to free ride on others and not feel the need to undertake measures of their own as
they are protected by the measures of others. However, this can be solved by mechanisms
ensuring that the costs are shared fairly among the Member States (see, for example, Thiele-
mann, 2008).
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Promoting peace and security in Europe is seen by many as one of the EU’s ideals. It is in
any case, as we will see in Step 10, one of its main objectives, or even the primary objective.
However, although it has been shown that funding of justice, freedom and security should be
increased, in practice this is difficult to achieve because it would imply either increasing the
total budget – which would be opposed by most governments and citizens – or decreasing
spending on agriculture and/or cohesion, which would also face opposition.
Concerning leverage effects, if countries collaborate in these areas, this will lead to spreading
best practices, which could have a positive effect on the efficiency of policies at national level.
Concerning the potential of this policy to improve public opinion of the EU, it is high. Security
is one of the main concerns of EU citizens and the EU would be more popular if it had a
visible role in this area. 
Step 8: Public opinion
The Eurobarometer does not include a question relating to home affairs in general but asks
about individual policies: fighting terrorism, fighting crime and immigration. Public opinion
is very supportive of policies to fight terrorism at EU level: 79 per cent believe that the EU
should have responsibility for fighting terrorism. This is most probably due to the perception
that this problem can only be tackled effectively at international level – a perception that large
externalities are present. Support is lower, but still high, for fighting crime (61 per cent) and
immigration (63 per cent). 
Step 9: Accountability 
Concerning accountability, these policies are among the most publicised at EU level as the
Commission is aware of the fact that they include some of its most popular activities. There-
fore there is a certain level of awareness of EU activities in this field, which makes them
more accountable. However, this does not apply to all the aspects of these policies.
Step 10: Normative justifiability
These issues are closely related to the objective of peace within the EU territory. Moreover,
the opening of the borders between the Member States is related to the movement of workers,
which itself can be seen as part of the single market. Therefore they derive their legitimacy
from both sources. 
Step 11: Subsidiarity
This policy is not an exclusive competence of the EU so it must pass the test. The analysis
based on fiscal federalism did make a very strong case that at least some aspects of these
policies can be considerably more efficient at EU level. 
Step 12: Proportionality
It was shown that areas of justice, freedom and security where very large externalities exist
are clearly justified at EU level for reasons of efficiency because they can no longer be
handled comprehensively at national level due to the opening of the borders. However, the
extent to which they are harmonised should depend on considerations of heterogeneity and
legitimacy.
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3.2.13 Research policy
Short description
EU spending on research currently amounts to approximately EUR 6 700
million per year or about 4.9 per cent of the budget. The entire amount is
spent under a Framework Programme negotiated every seven years.
The programme is divided into six categories. The biggest category,
“Cooperation”, funds research projects. “People” awards scholarships and
fellowships for researchers, “Capacities” funds research infrastructures and
“Ideas” finances frontier research. The other categories are funding for the
EU’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), a network of seven research centres
across the EU, and the EURATOM nuclear research programme.
Main results
The analysis shows that funding research programmes at EU level can lead
to large gains in efficiency due to significant economies of scale. However,
to be effective, funding should be allocated on the basis of excellence by
an independent agency. This could result in problems from a political
perspective as wealthier countries are likely to benefit more than poorer
countries. Nonetheless, due to the large potential gains in efficiency, this
report advises substantially increased research spending and making re-
search the second largest budget item after cohesion policy. 
Box 13  Analysis applied to research policy
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
The main justification for public intervention in research is a market failure: positive
externalities. Research by one company leads to new technologies that can be used by other
companies that did not have to invest in the research. Moreover, research and development is
one of the main drivers of economic growth, which can benefit society as a whole.
Step 2: Funding or regulation
Positive externalities justify government funding of research so that the amount of investment
in research is optimal for society. However, regulatory aspects are even more important,
because most of the investment comes from private sources. Therefore, it is necessary that
companies have a regulatory environment that provides the right incentives for them to invest
in research.
This is particularly relevant in the EU. Nunez Ferrer (2007) shows that investment in research
is sub-optimal at EU level, not from public sources but from private sources. Nunez Ferrer
argues that this is partly due to problems in the regulatory environment, such as over-regula-
tion and rigid labour markets.
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
Figueira and Nunez Ferrer (2008; p. 24) offer a mixed assessment: “on the one hand, the
Commission appears to be basing its policies on the right principles: the funding instruments
were designed with the concept of EU value-added in mind.” However, “there are concerns
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that the Commission is not the right body for project selection, and that it is influenced by
political considerations.”
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
The literature on traditional fiscal federalism generally concludes that these policies should
be at EU level due to the existence of economies of scale, as Member States can pool their
research capacities and human capital and avoid the duplication of research (Hoeller et al.,
1996). This applies particularly to strategic research areas, where the EU needs to reach a
critical mass through collaboration between Member States to be globally competitive.
Step 5: Heterogeneity
Heterogeneity is not a problem as EU countries have similar levels of economic development
and therefore similar needs in terms of research.
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
Persson et al. (1996) argue that since research institutions in European countries are inefficient
and badly organised, harmonisation, by increasing competition between the countries, could
increase efficiency.
Step 7: Political criteria
Concerning leverage, research is one of the areas where this effect is most important. Firstly,
the existence of funding programmes at EU level is an important incentive for the mobility
and cooperation of researchers. This leads to the creation of a Europe-wide research area
since research in Europe becomes cross-border, instead of compartmented by country. A larger
research area will be more productive as there will be less duplication of efforts and there
will be effects of competition and comparative advantage. Therefore, even relatively little
funding at EU level can have a substantial impact.
Another leverage effect of EU research policy is related to the fact that research policy at
national level is not suffering from a lack of public funding but from inappropriate legisla-
tion. Hence the right funding programmes can provide incentives to make national policies
more efficient.
Step 8: Public opinion
There is very wide support for EU action on “scientific and technological research”, with 72
per cent of the population thinking that the EU should be active in this field. This may be due
to the fact that people support transferring to EU level policies where they feel that cooperation
between Member States can lead to more efficient results. However, it is possible that support
would be lower if funding for research was significantly increased because if funding is allo-
cated on the basis of excellence, it will mainly be given to the wealthier countries which have
more established research institutions. This could be resented by the poorer Member States.
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
Concerning research policy, this is an area where governments often delegate part of the
decision-making to an independent agency as decisions on which research to support can be
made more efficiently if they are impartial and independent. When this is the case, having an
independent agency at EU level or national level should lead to the same degree of procedural
legitimacy. When this is not the case, it is possible that accountability is lower at EU level
and there is a risk that this policy could fall prey to vested interests.
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Research policy is directly related to the single market in two ways. One is that research and
development is an integral part of companies’ activities and therefore in a single market it is
necessary to have a regulatory environment that allows EU-wide research. The other is that
research at EU level fosters the mobility of researchers and the mobility of workers is needed
for the single market.
56
Step 11: Subsidiarity
Research policy clearly passes the fiscal federalism test as it can be more efficient at EU level.
Step 12: Proportionality
Currently, EU spending on research is low and benefits would be gained by increasing the
funds available.
3.2.14 Transport and energy
Short description
The Common Transport policy was introduced in 1958, as transport be-
tween countries was seen as being central to the single market. However,
until some years ago, the action of the EU was very limited as Member
States could not reach agreement on how to collaborate. Over the past few
years, it has become increasingly active. The main goal is to promote
inexpensive transport between the Member States by opening the markets
and creating transport links.
EU energy policy has recently gained a high profile due both to environ-
mental concerns and to energy security issues. The main action of the EU
in this area is opening the energy markets of the Member States to com-
petition. These two policies are managed together and several spending
programmes are common to both.
Spending accounts for 1.87 per cent of the budget. It finances the Trans-
European Networks (TENs), projects of international transport considered
to be of strategic importance. Other programmes include the Galileo satellite
system, the Marco Polo Programme for logistics, the intelligent energy
programme and nuclear energy.
Main results
This report proposes a significant increase in spending mainly to finance
TEN projects and energy grids. However, in addition to spending, more
use should be made of innovative ways of financing transport projects,
such as public-private partnerships.
Box 14  Analysis applied to transport and energy
Step 1: Market failure or equity goal
Transports and energy policies aim to correct a market failure of positive externalities. A
good transport and energy network benefits the entire industry and, through its impact on
economic growth, society as a whole. In addition, some infrastructures can be more efficiently
provided by the government than by the market due to increasing returns to scale.
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Step 2: Funding or regulation
This policy involves both funding and regulation. At EU level, (de)regulation is needed to
open up the Member States’ transport and energy markets and allow fair competition between
them. However, funding is also needed to improve technologies and in particular to promote
the interoperability of different countries’ technologies. The question is whether it should be
at EU or national level.
Step 3: Cost-effectiveness
The cost-effectiveness of the TENs is not optimal at present as the selection of projects to be
financed is heavily influenced by political criteria rather than being carried out on the basis of
value-added (Kernohan, 2006).
Step 4: Economies of scale and externalities
By definition, there are externalities in international transport and energy networks as they
affect at least two countries. In the case of the EU, these are increased by the fact that having
a common market enhances the need for a good transport system to carry goods between
countries, so a good transport system benefits all countries. It may even be argued that, due
to the single market, transport has become an EU public good. This is why transport policy
has always been seen as a core EU policy.
However, this does not necessarily imply that the EU should entirely fund the transport infra-
structures. Nunez Ferrer (2007) argues that it is not efficient for the EU to finance transport
infrastructures in its wealthier Member States as this could be done better nationally. As
regards poorer Member States, funding for transport is already included in the cohesion pro-
grammes.
Step 5: Heterogeneity
Despite differences between the infrastructures and technologies in different Member States,
heterogeneity in tastes is not a problem, except for some environmental aspects of transport
and energy and sensitive issues such as the desirability or otherwise of using nuclear energy.
Step 6: Second generation fiscal federalism
In Member States where public funding for transport infrastructures is insufficient, EU policy
could help compensate for this.
Step 7: Objectives of the EU budget
Although this section has argued for more investment in transport, as with other areas this
would imply reducing funding elsewhere. Issues of EU identity are not very relevant here.
Step 8: Public opinion
Public support for a common policy on energy is very high (68%). Conversely, support for a
common transport policy is mixed (49%).
Step 9: Procedural legitimacy
There is a certain lack of accountability in the way that funds are allocated to projects. This
could be improved if the selection followed better defined criteria related to the value-added
of the projects.
Step 10: Normative justifiability
Transport policy is directly linked to the transport of goods in the single market.
Step 11: Subsidiarity
Fiscal federalism has made a clear case for a common policy on international transport and
energy networks. However, it is not clear whether all the funding for these policies should
come from the EU level.
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Step 12: Proportionality
Spending on transport and energy accounts for only 1.68 per cent of the EU budget. This is
very low considering that EU spending could be very efficient in this area. Kernohan (2006)
argues that investment in TENs should be higher. In addition to spending, there should
also be more investment in innovative ways of financing transport projects and public-private
partnerships.
3.3 Proposal
The previous sections have shown that, for all the areas except one, at least
some funding is justified at EU level. However, at the same time, the EU
budget is very small. Some studies (such as the Sapir Report) have argued
that, given the small size of the budget, funding should be allocated to a
limited number of priority areas where it can be most useful. However, this
study has shown that for most areas of EU policy-making at least some
of the funding should come from EU level, as it goes hand in hand with
policy-making. However, that amount of funding is generally very small.
This study therefore proposes selecting a limited number of main areas
where the budget can be most useful, while allocating a small amount of
operational funding to the others.
From the proposals made for each policy area in the previous section, the
following structure can be derived:
• Cohesion policy should continue receiving the same share of the EU
budget; this is, currently approximately one third of the budget.
• Agriculture should no longer be an item in the budget.
• Spending on research policy should be significantly increased and this
should become, after cohesion policy, the second largest item.
• Four other policy areas should have their spending significantly
increased: development policy; external relations; justice, freedom and
security; and transport and energy.
• The following areas should receive only a small amount of opera-
tional funding: education; culture; social affairs and employment;
enterprise; environment; consumer and health policy; and communica-
tion.
It is suggested that the EU budget should maintain its current size as it is
sufficient to support the EU’s essentially legislative activities. As this
report does not assess administrative expenditure, it is assumed that it will
remain the same.
CONCLUSIONS
This report applied a multidisciplinary analysis to the EU budget to find the
optimal structure for its expenditure. Based on the analysis, a proposal was
made on how the EU budget should be restructured. The proposal is to
eliminate spending on agriculture, maintain spending on cohesion policy at
one third of the budget, divide most of the rest of the budget between five
policy areas (research, development, external relations, home affairs, trans-
port and energy) and allocate budget lines inferior to 1.5 per cent of the bud-
get to seven policy areas (education, culture, social affairs and employment,
enterprise, environment, consumer and health policy, and communication).
This study went into much greater detail into each of the policy areas than
the existing literature. However, further work is still needed to look at each
spending programme in even greater detail so as to define more specifically
how much should be spent on each, taking this proposal as a starting point.
This would have been outside the scope of this paper, particularly due to
space constraints.
Further research is also needed into the political economy of the EU bud-
get to find how, given the existing political realities, this proposal could be
adopted by the Member States. This would include determining which of
the reforms proposed in this study should be attempted by the Commission
in the current review and which should be left for future reviews.
A surprising conclusion of this study is that the EU budget should not re-
flect the priorities of the EU. This is because EU activities are mainly
based on regulation and not on funding so a decision on whether to fund a
policy at EU level should mainly be based on whether funding is needed to
support the regulatory activities. Some very important EU policies do not
require funding (other than for administrative costs), such as the single
market or competition policy. Conversely, some policies – such as develop-
ment policy – are not very important at EU level but funding is required
on a larger scale to support the policy and is cost-effective at EU level.
The EU budget may be small in size but it plays a very important role in
supporting the activities of the EU; it is essential therefore that it is spent
correctly. The political reality of the procedures and negotiations at EU
level makes it impossible to radically change the way in which the budget
is spent in the immediate future. For example, it would be impossible to
have no spending on agriculture in the next Financial Perspectives. How-
ever, incremental reforms are possible and the ongoing review can, and
should, be a major step on the long road to giving the EU budget its
optimal structure.
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SAMMANFATTNING PÅ SVENSKA
Den pågående översynen av EU:s budget kan leda till en eftertraktad re-
form av Europas finanser. Europeiska kommissionen har fått ett mandat av
medlemsstaterna att än en gång djupgående granska av den gemensamma
budgeten. Även om de ekonomiska och institutionella kriserna försvårar
möjligheterna att nå en uppgörelse, kan översynen trots allt leda till bety-
dande resultat.
EU:s budget har länge kritiserats för att vara dåligt anpassad till dagens
EU. Nästan hälften av budgeten går till jordbruket, en sektor som krymper
i Europa. Samtidigt får områden som ökar i betydelse i den dagliga verk-
samheten – som till exempel rättsliga och inrikes frågor och ekonomisk
tillväxt – nästan inga medel alls. Det finns därför en uppfattning, både
inom EU:s institutioner och i medlemsstaternas regeringar, att EU:s budget
måste reformeras i grunden.
När kommissionen nu skissar på ett reformförslag är det dock uppenbart
att den litteratur som finns tillgänglig inte ger en bra grund att stå på,
eftersom den inte tar hänsyn till den politiska verkligheten. Framför allt
missar många studier att det inte går att sätta likhetstecken mellan EU:s
budget och nationella budgetar: EU är framför allt en lagstiftande union,
där makten att spendera gemensamma medel är liten och huvudsakligen
till för att stödja lagstiftningsarbetet. Därför behövs en annan typ av ana-
lys, som tar upp inte bara de ekonomiska frågorna utan också de politiska
aspekterna.
Den här rapporten bidrar till att fylla hålet i litteraturen genom att föreslå
en metod för att analysera EU:s budget på ett sätt som stämmer bättre
överens med den politiska verkligheten. Metoden är multidisciplinär och
kombinerar en gren av nationalekonomin som vanligen används för att
analysera EU och EU:s budget (fiskal federalism) med en annan gren av
nationalekonomin (offentlig ekonomi). Den tar även hänsyn till statsveten-
skapliga aspekter och subsidiaritetsprincipen. Utifrån dessa härleds sedan
en tolvstegsanalys som appliceras på EU:s huvudsakliga policyområden för
att bestämma om de bör finansieras från EU:s budget eller ej.
Analysen tar även upp två punkter som ofta glöms bort i litteraturen om
EU:s budget. För det första bör man ta hänsyn till olika underkategorier
när ett policyområde analyseras och inte bara området i sin helhet. För det
andra bör man inte isolera EU:s budget från de nationella budgetarna.
Även om forskare på senare tid har börjat uppmärksamma detta, finns det
såvitt rapportens författare känner till ännu ingen omfattande analys av
EU:s budget som tar hela steget ut.
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Rapporten fokuserar därför på vilka delar av varje policyområde som bör
finansieras av EU:s budget – snarare än att fokusera på områdena i stort.
Argumentet är att det som är intressant i sammanhanget är vilka specifika
program inom ett antal olika policyområden som ska finansieras av EU:s
budget och inte om ett område ska ges finansiering överhuvudtaget. Detta
hänger ihop med den andra punkten, nämligen att EU:s budget inte bör
isoleras från de nationella budgetarna. EU-program finns parallellt med
nationella program och måste också utformas därefter.
Även om den här rapporten lägger vikt vid EU:s politiska verklighet, är
rekommendationerna med avsikt inte baserade på politisk ekonomi. Med
andra ord: rapporten föreslår en optimal struktur för EU:s budget utan att
ta någon särskild hänsyn till vilka uppgörelser som eventuellt är troligast
vid förhandlingarna om nästa budgetplan. Det första steget bör vara att be-
stämma vilka områden och program som bör finansieras från EU:s budget.
Steg två är att bestämma vilka reformer – i syfte att över tid etablera en
optimal budget – som kan uppnås inom ramen för budgetöversynen och
vilka reformer som måste lämnas åt framtiden.
Kort sammanfattning av metoden
De första stegen i metoden härleds från offentlig ekonomi, den gren av
nationalekonomin som analyserar statsmaktens aktiviteter. Teorierna ger stöd
åt de flesta politikområdena på den nationella nivån, men Figueira (2008)
menar att de ofta glöms bort på EU-nivån. De första stegen eller frågorna är:
1. Behövs utgifterna för att a) åtgärda ett marknadsmisslyckande eller
b) nå ett rättvisemål?
2. Kräver detta statsmaktens inblandning i form av lagstiftning eller
budgetutgifter?
3. Kan ingripandet göras kostnadseffektivt?
Nästa steg i metoden härleds från fiskal federalism, den gren av national-
ekonomin som analyserar vilken av statsmaktens funktioner som bör
användas vid central, regional respektive lokal nivå. Att teorin tillämpas på
EU-nivån innebär att analysen istället används för att avgöra vad EU
respektive medlemsstaterna bör ansvara för. De tre steg som härleds från
fiskal federalism är:
4. Bör utgifterna finansieras på EU-nivå eftersom de behandlar externa
effekter eller innebär stordriftsfördelar?
5. Eller bör utgifterna allokeras till den nationella nivån eftersom det
finns för stora skillnader mellan medlemsstaternas syn på ett spe-
cifikt politikområde?
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6. Finns det inom området svårigheter eller misslyckanden på nationell
nivå som kan undvikas på EU-nivå?
I den här rapporten argumenteras för att en analys av EU:s budget också
måste ta in politiska aspekter. Därför måste vi analysera frågan utifrån två
håll. För det första – steg 7 – måste en diskussion föras om EU:s bud-
getprioriteringar: kan budgeten ses som medlemsstaternas förhandlings-
verktyg; som ett sätt att göra EU mer populärt; som en hävstång för natio-
nell politik; eller som ett allokerings- eller omfördelningsinstrument?
För det en andra krävs en diskussion utifrån statsvetenskaplig litteratur om
vilka områden som är legitima på EU-nivån. De följande stegen eller frå-
gorna är därför:
8. Ger opinionen stöd för att politiken ska föras på EU- eller nationell
nivå?
9. Är det mer demokratiskt och lättare att utkräva ansvar på EU- eller
den nationella nivån, med hänsyn till de procedurer som finns?
10. Är det motiverat från en normativ synpunkt att föra politiken till
EU-nivån?
Slutligen används rättsliga principer från EG-fördraget för ytterligare väg-
ledning. Steg 11 utgår från subsidiaritetsprincipen, som säger att EU endast
bör agera inom områden där effektiviteten är större än om politiken stan-
nar kvar på den nationella nivån. Steg 12 tar sin utgångspunkt i proportio-
nalitetsprincipen, som säger att om EU ingriper ska ingripandet vara pro-
portionellt, det vill säga begränsas till vad som är nödvändigt för att nå
målet.
Slutsatser
I rapportens andra del tillämpas metoden på EU:s utgifter. Varje utgifts-
område analyseras med tolvstegsmetoden. Svaren på dessa frågor gör det
möjligt att avgöra om en specifik utgift ska finnas i EU:s budget eller inte.
Rapporten landar i två huvudsakliga slutsatser. För det första – något som
står i kontrast till rekommendationer från den akademiska litteraturen – bör
EU:s budget inte vara en exakt reflektion av EU:s politiska prioriteringar.
Förklaringen är att EU:s aktiviteter baseras på lagstiftning snarare än på ut-
gifter. Ett beslut om att finansiera en politik på EU-nivån bör med andra
ord tas om finansiering är nödvändig för att stödja regleringen och inte på
hur viktig politiken anses vara på EU-nivån.
För det andra bör EU:s budget rikta in sig på ett litet antal områden, så att
den blir användbar trots sin ringa storlek. Samtidigt vet vi att EU idag är
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engagerad i nästan alla politikområden och att det av effektivitetsskäl där-
för är nödvändigt att fortsätta stödja dessa områden. En möjlig lösning
vore att behålla små budgetposter för att ge stöd åt ett stort antal politik-
områden.
De konkreta förslagen är följande:
• Sammanhållningspolitiken bör även fortsättningsvis ges samma andel
från budgeten, det vill säga ungefär en tredjedel;
• Den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken bör inte längre vara en utgifts-
post i EU:s budget;
• Utgifterna för att finansiera forskningspolitiken bör öka markant och
bli den näst största utgiftsposten efter sammanhållningspolitiken;
• Fyra områden bör tilldelas betydligt större resurser: utvecklingspoli-
tiken; externa relationer; frihet, säkerhet och rättvisa; samt transport
och energi;
• Följande områden bör ges endast en liten andel operationella resurser:
utbildning; kultur; sysselsättning och socialpolitik; företag; miljö;
konsument- och hälsopolitik; och kommunikation.
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